Below are selections from my review of Louis Dupré’s, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture. If you are interested in reading the “full” review, just click on the link above. (In light of the recent Schuld posts, I thought that Dupré’s take on the differences between ancient and modern autobiographies might stir up some interesting discussion).
In chapter 3, “A New Sense of Selfhood,” Dupré discusses the new conception of the human being that corresponds with the new cosmology. In contradistinction with the ancient self, the modern self “defines reality, rather than being defined by it” (p. 46). In his “thesis” section, “The Modern Predicament: The Self, Subject or Substance” (pp. 46-53), Dupre engages in an extended discussion of the ways in which the problem of the self as subject and/or substance determined the theoretical discussion of personhood during the Enlightenment. On the one hand you have rationalist philosophers (following Descartes’ lead) defining the self primarily as a “source of meaning” (p. 47). Then in reaction to Descartes’ understanding of the human person as res cogitans and res extensa, we see the emergence of materialism (e.g., Condillac) in which the human person is viewed as part of the mechanistic universe. Toward the end of this section, Dupré mentions objectors to the sensationalist theory (e.g., Diderot and Buffon). Diderot, for example, finds the sensationalist theory insufficient for explaining the birth of consciousness (p. 51). Buffon position attempts to overcome material reductionism, however, he still leaves us with the problem of Cartesian dualism. Dupré ends the section by stating that both philosophy and literature during this time display an awakened subjectivity (p. 53). He then turns to discuss those representing a more subjective view.
In the section entitled, “Passions, Feelings, and Emotions,” (pp. 53-67) Dupré discusses the reactions in the literary world to the unsatisfactory picture of the dichotomous self inherited from Descartes and others. Here the attempt to bridge the gap between the self as subject of meaning and the self as substantial reality took an inward or introspective turn (e.g., Shaftesbury, Rousseau). For Shaftesbury, self-knowledge consists primarily in an awareness of one’s feelings (p. 54). Rousseau made similar claims, arguing that feeling, not reason forms the “core of mind” (p. 54). Dupré also mentions the role played by the novel in the 17th century. The novel, having become increasingly introspective, served as a “reflection on the complex interaction of feelings, passions, and emotions in love” (p. 55). On pages 57-67 Dupré continues his discussion of the various emerging literary genres, providing interesting insights in regard to differences between ancient and modern autobiographies. For example, earlier autobiographies had described the self in relation to others (e.g., St. Augustine and Teresa of Avila). During the Enlightenment, the relation with others was no longer a dialogue and instead “displayed the controlling presence of the author” (p. 62). Modern autobiographies became in effect increasingly self-focused. “As each person possesses a strictly private, incommunicable awareness of him or herself, so each must find his or her own way to truth” (pp. 62-63).