Kuhn on Paradigms and so-called "Objective Facts"

By Cynthia R. Nielsen

Arguably Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) has been one of the most influential publications in the 20th century in regard to the philosophy of science, with of course far-reaching implications in many other realms. In fact, one might say that Kuhn’s work paved the way for science’s taking serious the findings of other disciplines (e.g., sociology, ethics, aesthetics) and has forced us to once again question the idea of “neutral” facts. In our evaluations of scientific theories, we must never forget that scientists are human beings and have their prejudices and presuppositions—just as we all do.

Though difficult to precisely define as used by Kuhn, a Kuhnian paradigm can be understood as an agreement among a certain group of scientists in regard to certain concrete solutions to central problems in one’s particular field. To put it differently and more broadly, one might also think of a paradigm as a type of worldview, for it involves both agreement and commitment to the paradigm. As Kuhn points out, science is not simply concerned with so-called “neutral” facts, nor is the scientist free from his/her presuppositions. If this is the case, then holding one paradigm over another is largely influenced by one’s educational background, training, values and many other factors that fund one’s worldview. Consequently, Kuhn suggests that he notion that science is merely an “objective” activity in which one comes to the “facts” and makes his/her conclusions in a “neutral” fashion is in actuality illusory and should be rejected.

In bringing our attention to the various sociological (and other) factors related to the forming of scientific theories, Kuhn claims that those holding the former prevailing paradigm tend to hold not “disinterestedly” to their view, but instead, “tenaciously” and often in spite of the “facts.” As Kuhn explains, the older scientists who resist the proposal of a new paradigm by the younger scientists (i.e., those not so tightly bound to or invested in the former paradigm) have a great deal to lose by rejecting their old paradigm and are faced with something more than a a mere “scientific” dilemma. Ethical issues, funding for research, and issues of one’s reputation are also aspects that must be factored into the “why” one chooses one paradigm over another.

In my opinion, Kuhn’s rejection of and calling into question so-called “neutral” facts is one of his most powerful contributions. The notion of a “fact” completely lacking in normative interpretation would simply constitute a meaningless fact (or as Van Til likes to say a “brute fact”). In reality, all facts are both theory-laden and involve human interpretation. It is simply impossible to have knowledge of facts apart from human interpretation. Given this situation, how can we fail to conclude that knowledge necessarily involves interpretation? As Reformed theologian, John Frame explains,

“We have no access to reality apart from our interpretative faculties. To seek such access is to seek release from creaturehood. We cannot step outside of our own skins. […] It is better to recognize frankly that all statements of fact are interpretations of reality and that all true interpretations are factual. When we speak of ‘checking out the facts,’ we are talking about comparing ideas (interpretation) of which we are unsure with ideas (interpretations) of which we are more sure. But we never dig deep enough to reach some ‘bedrock’ of pure factuality—facts undefiled by any interpretative activity. Such facts, by definition, could not be known at all, because knowledge itself is always interpretation” (The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, p. 72.).

Similarly, as Kuhn observes, people decide what the facts are in conjunction with their system of interpretation. This being the case, there is no significant difference between determining what the facts are and determining the best system of interpretation, but rather these are the same process seen from different perspectives (Ibid., p. 72). Here we should note that the use of “fact” in this context is synonymous with “statement of fact.” The point being that in making a statement of fact one is in effect offering an interpretation of reality; hence, the two cannot be differentiated in any significant way [1]. Thus, Kuhn rightly brings to our attention that the idea of some kind of pure knowledge of fact untainted by our interpretation is simply illusory, and he emphasizes that scientists, whose work involves more than simply “observing” but likewise consists in analyzing and evaluating “facts,” are not exempt.

This being the case, then we cannot affirm that scientific theories simply report the “pure observed data.” By nature such theories go beyond the “data.” For example, take the issue of origins as set forth by evolutionary theorists. Another Reformed apologist, Dr. Greg Bahnsen, highlights the tension by asking how questions of origins are supposed to fit within the realm of empirical science. In other words, in what way is the methodology of science equipped to deal with events that are neither recurring nor repeatable under experimental control? It would appear more accurate to say that regarding the matter of origins as presented in the evolutionary theory, we have a theory based not on “facts” but on speculation. The scientist may reply that the study of present materials and processes allows one to extrapolate backwards in order to determine what “must have” occurred. However, as Bahnsen points out, this is a departure of science’s own basic methodology. In operating this way, the scientist is not observing but speculating on the course of historical development. She in no way demonstrates experimentally, but rather (as David Hume so clearly brought to our attention)assumes the uniformity of nature, and in so doing assumes that processes observed today have always operated as they do at present. Thus, as Bahnsen time and again emphasized, her pretending to answer questions about origins by extrapolating the observable present into the unobservable past is to reason in a vicious circle. Here it seems that we must conclude that such an approach can in no way be said to uphold the supposed descriptive role of science.

Frame, Bahnsen and Kuhn though no doubt disagreeing on a number of important issues, would certainly be in unision regarding the claim that scientists—as is the case with all living, breathing, embodied human beings—operate on the basis of pre-commitments and presuppositions that influence and even to a large degree determine the way that they “see” the so-called “objective facts.” As Frame explains,

“What we ‘see,’ ‘hear,’ ‘smell,’ ‘taste,’ and ‘feel’ is influenced by our expectations. Those expectations do not come from just sense-experience but from theories, cultural experience, group loyalties, prejudice, religious commitments, and so forth. Thus, there is no ‘purely empirical’ inquiry. We never encounter ‘brute,’ that is, uninterpreted, facts. We only encounter facts that have been interpreted in terms of our existing commitments. Often, then, scientists do not recognize data that contradict their theories. But even when they do, they do not immediately accept such data as refutations of the theories in question. An apparent contradictory datum constitutes a ‘problem’ to be solved in terms of the theory, not a refutation of it. Only when the problems multiply and alternative theories begin to look more promising will the scientist abandon his theory for another” (Ibid., p. 117).

Notes
[1] Frame emphasizes that this is not to say that facts understood as states of affairs are thus identical with one’s interpretations of them. It is, however, to assert that facts understood as “statement of fact” are indeed interpretations (100).