Per Caritatem

The Catholic scholar, John Patrick Donnelly, S.J. in his book, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace, shows that Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562) was thoroughly acquainted with Aristotle and St. Thomas, as well as a number of other medievals (Lombard), patristics, and numerous ancient philosophers. In fact, Vermigli wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; however, he only completed through book III. Vermigli’s approach to the relationship of theology and philosophy and the appropriation of the latter for the service of the former, has much in common with St.Thomas.

Having examined Vermigli’s thought on a number of topics (e.g., reason and revelation, philosophical anthropology, soteriology), Donnelly, near the end of his book, devotes some space to address the claims of older scholarship on the supposed intrinsic link between Protestantism and nominalism. Representatives of the older view, e.g., John Todd and Joseph Lortz, see nominalism as a “decadent scholasticism, even a theology no longer authentically Catholic. They see Luther’s theology partly as a direct result of his nominalist background, partly as a reaction against it, especially its Pelagianism. For these Catholic authors several of Luther’s central teachings—justification by extrinsic imputation, simul justus et peccator, predestination, distrust of human reason—are rooted in nominalist presuppositions. In fact, none of these Catholic authors has an expert background in nominalist theology or philosophy. Recent research, especially that of Heiko Oberman, has revised their interpretation of nominalism, seeing it in a more favorable light, employing more precise scholarship, and re-opening the question of Luther’s relation to the whole Occamist tradition[1]” (pp. 202-203). Donnelly goes on to say that he is not necessarily denying certain aspects of the influence of nominalism on Luther’s personal development, nor is he purporting to give an analysis of the “proper evaluation of nominalism as a philosophical or theological system” (p. 204). It is, however, a calling-into-question the claim that there is an intrinsic connection between Protestantism and nominalism. “The thesis that Occam is the foster father of Protestantism needs revision in the light of Peter Martyr’s theology.” With Martyr, we have a theologian who maintains essential continuity with the Protestant distinctives of Calvin and Luther; however, Martyr “came to these conclusions out of a generally Thomistic rather than Occamist background. The same applies a fortiori to Zanchi [1516-1592]” (p. 204).

Notes
[1] In a footnote (n. 13), Donnelly states that “several recent Catholic studies, independently of Oberman, have begun a reassessment of the relationship between nominalism and the Reformation, particularly McSorley, 183-215, and Francis Clark, Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation, (London: 1960), 296-322. William J. Courtenay reviews the recent literature, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” […] in Charles Trinkas and Heiko A. Oberman, editors, The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, (Leiden, 1974),” [Donnelly, p. 203].

[This post concludes my brief introduction to Muller’s thesis].

In a section titled, “The Design and Scope of the Present Study,” Muller begins to explicitly state the various assumptions and aspects of his continuity thesis, or better his “double” continuity and discontinuity thesis. As we saw in the previous two posts, Muller contends that the Reformed scholastics are a continuation of the Reformed tradition (not a major departure) begun by the early Reformers; hence, the continuity aspect of his thesis. However, Muller does not equate continuity with identity, which would be an oversimplistic and even impossible claim, and thus, he also recognizes elements of discontinuity as Reformed scholasticism develops. Consequently, Muller rejects the idea of pitting “Calvin” against the “Calvinists” (meaning here the Reformed scholastics), which argues for an essential discontinuity between the two. An example of the kind of discontinuity highlighted by Muller is that in the Reformed scholastics, given the historical situation and the needs of the Protestant tradition to codify its doctrines for institutional and other teaching purposes, we find significantly more “positive reference to medieval theology, more overt use of scholastic distinctions, and a broader reliance on reason for the development of theological concepts” than are explicitly manifest in the early Reformers. Yet, even in Luther and Calvin, and especially in Peter Martyr Vermigli (who was quite conversant with Aristotelian and Thomistic categories), one cannot deny the debt to medieval theology and philosophy. Hence, the first aspect of Muller’s thesis is “that continuity and discontinuity must be traced out across a broad spectrum of thinkers and documents in the Reformed tradition” with “attention given to the genres and the historical location of the documents in specific contexts.” In sum, any study of the development from the early Reformation period to the Protestant scholastics “worth its salt” must recognize “the diversity and variety of Reformed thought both in its beginnings and in its later forms: there is simply not a monolithic unity to be found in Reformed orthodoxy [=Reformed scholasticism], nor can its varied but confessional theology be reduced to a single paradigm” (Post-Reformation Dogmatics, p. 38).

The second aspect of Muller’s thesis deals with the “theological methods of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (Ibid., p. 38). Here Muller addresses a common criticism leveled at Reformed scholastics, viz., they became too rationalistic, developing deductive theological systems and a theology based on and driven by one doctrine (e.g., predestination, covenant etc.). However, Muller shows that when we examine the methods of both the early Reformers and their scholastic successors, we find that “the relationship between exegesis and the topical formulation of theology precluded the creation of either a purely rational or deductive theology or of a theology grounded on topically defined ‘central dogmas’” (Ibid., p. 39). To claim that the scholastic method employed by the Protestant scholastics necessarily paved the way to rationalistic systems would seem to implicate many medieval theologians and philosophers (e.g., St. Thomas), which some Protestants are of course eager to do, and to ignore textual evidence of the Protestant scholastics themselves. “Indeed, the evidence indicates that the scholastic method of the Reformed orthodox [=Protestant scholastics], with its highly developed sense of prolegomena and principia and its intentional balance between revealed doctrinal content and rational examination and defense of doctrine, militated against rationalism and against the dogmatic deductivism of such theological models as the central dogma hypothesis” (Ibid., p. 39).

Third, Muller states that in light of the problems inherent in the central dogma theories in attempting to explain the development of Reformed theology, “the various ‘centrisms’ of much modern discussion of these older materials must be set aside” (e.g., whether there is a theocentric or Christocentric, or any-other-centric center in Reformed theology) [Ibid., p. 39].

Fourth, one must understand the theologies of the Protestant scholastics “in terms of the trajectories of intellectual history that extend through the sixteenth into the seventeenth century” (p. 39). In light of the fact that Protestant theology was now being discussed in the major Protestant universities, the scholastic methodology (which itself was a hybrid of medieval and Renaissance elements) was adopted to aid theological discourse given its structural clarity and synthetic quality.[1]

Fifth, in order to properly understand the development of Reformed theology up to the 18th century, one must examine the roles of both the history of exegesis and the history philosophy as they relate to the Reformed tradition. With regard to the history of exegesis, even with the shift in theological method (i.e., more explicitly scholastic), one still finds a great deal of continuity between the early Reformers and their successors in terms of their interpretations of particular biblical passages. Thus, systematic methodology is not driving exegesis but rather the former is birthed out of the latter. With regard to the history of philosophy and the development to Protestant scholasticsm, “here we identify a consistent classical note throughout the period, a continuity of Christian Aristotlianism, with the newer rationalism finding little support either from the theology of the Reformers in its inception or from the teachings of the orthodox in its development” (Ibid., p. 40).

Much more could be stated and elaborated with regard to Muller’s thesis. However, I hope this at least provides a “taste” of Muller’s work and his approach the Protestant scholastics.

Bibliography

Muller, Richard A. Post-Reformation Dogmatics: Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, Vol. 1, Prolegomena to Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003.

Notes

[1] There were of course other teaching methods used for laypersons and those not engaged in formal, academic roles.

As we highlighted in the previous post, Muller argues that the Protestant scholastics were not a great departure from the early Reformers but were in essentially agreement with teachings of their predecessors and continued in a distinctively Reformed trajectory. Moreover, just as the early Reformers themselves constituted a pluriform movement exhibiting continuities and discontinuites with the medieval tradition, so too Protestant scholasticism manifests the same diversity and complexity. As Martin Klauber explains, Muller’s,

“important interpretation recasts the entire period and portrays essential continuity in theological organization in the west from the introduction of Aristotle in the twelfth century to the decline in orthodoxy in the eighteenth century. Muller does for the post-Reformation period what Heiko Oberman has done for the Reformation era in pointing out the aspects of continuity with medieval antecedents. Oberman resurrected late medieval nominalism from the doldrums of its reputation as a decadent system deviating from the heights of Thomistic clarity. Muller illustrates the rich vitality of the post-Reformation theological system, one that had hitherto been considered arid and devoid of practical piety” (“Continuity and Discontinuity,” p. 467).

Though it is no doubt the case that scathing and vitriolic remarks directed at Aristotelian philosophy and the “schoolmen” can be found in the writings of Luther and Calvin, Muller argues that upon closer examination one finds that much of this anti-scholastic aversion was directed at very specific “schoolmen.” For example in the case of Calvin, we again find continuity and discontinuity. As Muller explains,

“Calvin’s theology—whether from the perspective of its methods or from the perspective of its contents—did not arise in a sixteenth-century vacuum. Not only did Calvin formulate his theology in distinct opposition to elements of late medieval and early sixteenth-century Roman Catholicism; he also quite subtly felt the influence of the medieval as well as the patristic past. It is worth recognizing from the outset that the Reformation altered comparatively few of the major loci of theology; the doctrines of justification, the sacraments, and the church received the greatest emphasis, while the doctrines of God, the trinity, creation, providence, predestination [which was not an invention of Calvin, but is a teaching also found in St. Augustine and St. Thomas], and the last things were taken over by the magisterial Reformation virtually without alteration” (The Unaccomodated Calvin, p. 39). Muller also makes a strong case for the hypothesis that “scholastici” and “théologiens Sorboniques” are not equivalent terms, and that Calvin’s strongest attacks are directed at the latter group, the faculty of the Sorbonne, and not against, e.g., Peter Lombard and what Calvin deems the “more sound” scholastici (Ibid., p. 57).

Another important contribution of Muller centers on his discussion of “scholasticism” as primarily a method of organization that does not necessarily imply a certain content. In light of the fact that the first and second generation Reformers did not leave a fully developed system of doctrine, it became the task of the Protestant scholastics to codify the Reformed teachings for the purposes of teaching and to ensure the survival of Protestantism. Furthermore, just as the doctrinal formulations of the early Reformation did not occur in a historical vacuum, neither did Protestant scholasticism “occur in isolation from theological system or from the Western philosophical tradition.” Scripture was held by both the early Reformers and the Protestant scholastics as the “absolute norm of doctrine.” However, “they never intended that the whole body of Christian doctrine be reconstructed without reference to the doctrinal developments and systematic constructions of the past—and even if that had been their intention, it would have hardly been possible. The Reformers, after all, assumed the truth of the larger body of received doctrine and attacked only what they perceived to be errors. They did not intend to reconstruct the doctrine of the Trinity or of the Person of Christ or of the creation of the world and the providence of God.” Rather, the development of doctrinal confessions and codifications of the Protestant scholastic period (late 16th-17th centuries) consisted in “the adjustment of a received body of doctrine and its systematic relations to the needs of Protestantism, in terms dictated by the teachings of the Reformers on Scripture, grace, justification, and the sacraments” ( , p. 34).

Returning to his understanding of “scholasticism” as a method of presenting material (in this case theological material) and contra the prominent 19th century speculative and a-historical “central-dogma” theories—e.g., predestination is the controlling principle of Reformed scholastic systems—Muller shows that the reason for utilizing the scholastic model of teaching has to do with the process of the institutionalization of Protestant doctrine in the universities during the late 16th and 17th centuries. According to Muller,

“[t]he theology of the great systems written in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, like the theology of the thirteenth century teachers, is preeminently a school theology. It is a theology designed to develop a system on a highly technical level and in an extremely precise manner by means of the careful identification of topics, division of these topics into their basic parts, definition of the parts, and doctrinal or logical argumentation concerning the divisions and definitions. This, moreover is the sense of the term used by the writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth century to describe their academic, technical, and disputative theology as distinct from other genre and approaches, namely, the catechetical, biblical-exegetical, and simply didactic or ecclesial” (Ibid., pp. 34-35).

Lastly, the scholastic method of the Protestant scholastics was not identical with that of its medieval predecessors. Rather, it is a kind of hybrid of medieval and Renaissance elements, which incorporated linguistic, philosophical, and logical aspects characteristic of Renaissance scholars. “The mastery of ancient languages typical of the Protestant scholastic writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, like their use of the locus method and inclusion of elements of rhetorical as distinct from demonstrative argumentation, serves to distinguish this later scholasticism from its medieval ancestor: in each of these characteristics, Protestant scholasticism evidences itself a child of the Renaissance as well as a child of the Middle Ages. […] This mixed heritage of Protestant orthodoxy [=Protestant scholasticism] is an indication of the kind of continuity that developing Protestantism maintained with the Reformation—which itself drew on both the scholastic and the humanist models” (Ibid., p. 36). Interestingly, the Protestant scholastics distinguished between the scholasticism of the 12th and 13th centuries and that of the 14th and 15th centuries and considered the former superior and less problematic than the latter (Ibid., p. 36). Just as it would be inaccurate and facile to accuse St. Thomas of simply embracing Aristotle wholesale and then presenting Christianity in a rationalistic system, so too it is mistaken to assume that Protestant scholastics present an arid, rationalistic, deductive system based on e.g., predestination as the controlling principle.[1] This not only neglects the sources themselves (e.g., Turretin’s Institutes, and even Calvin’s 1559 Institutes where predestination does not even appear until book III and even there is not the focal point of the book), but fails to understood the role of Prolegomena and principia in Reformed orthodoxy where the presuppositions and principles of Reformed theology are made explicit.

In part III, we shall take more detailed look at the various aspects of Muller’s thesis itself.

Bibliography

1. Klauber, Martion I. “Continuity and Discontinuity in Post-Reformation Reformed Theology: An Evaluation of the Muller Thesis,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 33/4 (December 1990): 467-475.
2. Muller, Richard A. Post-Reformation Dogmatics: Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, Vol. 1, Prolegomena to Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003.
3. Muller, Richard A. The Unaccompanied Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition. New York, Oxford, 2000.

Notes
[1] As Muller time and again reiterates, “since scholasticism is primarily a method or approach to academic disciplines, it is not necessarily allied to any particular philosophical perspective, nor does it represent a systematic attachment to or concentration upon any particular doctrine or concept as a key to theological system. This point has always been clear with respect to medieval scholasticism, but it needs to be made just as decisively with regard to Protestant scholasticism” (Post-Reformation Dogmatics, p. 37).

According to Richard A. Muller, Protestant scholasticism (which he uses synonymously with “orthodox Protestantism”) has been woefully neglected when compared to the attention given to the study of early Reformers (e.g., Luther) and second generation Reformers (e.g., Calvin). The Protestant scholastics of the late 16th and early 17th centuries were the confessional and doctrinal codifiers without whom Protestantism would not have survived. In their systematizing and institutionalizing endeavors, the Protestant scholastics both embraced the distinctives of the early Reformers, and also sought to “identify themselves and their theology with the cause of catholic or universal Christian truth” (p. 28). In other words, just as Heiko Oberman has suggested a relation of continuity (and of course discontinuity) between Luther and his medieval predecessors, so too Muller accepts Oberman’s continuity thesis in which not only first and second generation Reformers adopt the major theological loci of medieval scholasticism (of course there were differences here as well, e.g., justification), but likewise Muller argues that the Protestant scholastics do not exhibit a substantive departure from the early Reformers. As Muller observes, Reformed orthodoxy was by no means a monolithic movement. Both its doctrine and its biblical exegesis formed what Muller calls a “confessional spectrum.” Although in continuity with the early Reformers and embracing Protestant distinctives, Protestant scholasticism, of course, is not a mere reduplication of early Protestant theology. Hence, continuity should not be understood as an exact repetition, nor should discontinuity be understood simply as any change or variation from the earlier tradition. As Muller explains, Protestant scholasticism,

“is clearly a theology both like and unlike that of the Reformation, standing in continuity with the great theological insights of the Reformers but developing in a systematic and scholastic fashion different from the patterns of the Reformation and frequently reliant on the forms and methods of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. This double continuity ought not be either surprising or disconcerting. Instead, it ought to be understood as one example among many of the way in which the church both moves forward in history, adapting to new situations and insights, and at the same time retains its original identity as the community of faith” (pp. 28-29).

Muller also makes a point not to present Calvin, as the sole standard and expression of Reformed Protestantism.[1] In addition to the diverse and pluriform nature of Reformed Protestantism mentioned above, we should keep in mind that Calvin was only one Reformer among many and he himself was in constant dialogue with other Reformers (e.g., Vermigli), gleaning from their insights and often adjusting his own teaching as a result of such dialogues. Moreover, Calvin was not a primary author of a number of important confessional documents within the Reformed tradition (e.g., the Belgic Confession, the Second Helvetic Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism to name a few). In fact, many individuals who are considered “Calvinists” differ from Calvin in both doctrine and method (e.g., B. Keckermann, W. Perkins) [p. 30]. In light of such diversity and pluriformity, Muller suggests that “the better part of historical valor (namely, discretion) requires the rejection of the term ‘Calvinists’ and ‘Calvinism’ in favor of the more historically accurate term, ‘Reformed’” (p. 30).

Muller, following Otto Weber, divides the post-Reformation development of Protestantism into three periods: early, high and late orthodoxy. Early orthodoxy consists in two phases, ca. 1565-1618-1640. The beginning date, 1565, signals the death of many important second generation codifiers of the Reformed tradition (e.g., Calvin, W. Musculus, and Peter Martyr Vermigli). The Synod of Dort and the outbreak of the Thirty Years War took place around 1618, which marks the end of the first early phase and the beginning of the second early phase. Major figures of the first phase of early orthodoxy include: Z. Ursinus, C. Olevianus, T. Beza, and W. Perkins, while the second phase of early orthodoxy introduced figures such as J. Polyander, F. Gomarus and J. Maccovius, who contributed significantly to the confessional documents of the early 17th century (p. 31). High orthodoxy covers most of the 17th century, as well as the first quarter of the 18th century (ca. 1640-1685-1725). It also consists in two phases, early and late. High orthodoxy “possesses a broader and more explicit grasp of the tradition, particularly of the contribution of the Middle Ages” (p. 31). Important figures of the early high orthodoxy phase include: J. Cocceius, G. Voetius, F. Turretin, and John Owen. After 1685, a change occurred and we see less emphasis and influence than in the previous thirty years of the works of traditional Protestant scholastic writers in terms of an “intellectual pattern” in the church and in the theological faculties of Protestant universities [p. 32]. “The changes that took place included an increased pressure on the precritical textual, exegetical, and hermeneutical model of orthodoxy, an alteration of the philosophical model used by theologians from the older Christian Aristotelian approach to either a variant of the newer rationalism or a virtually a-philosophical version of dogmatics” (p. 32). There were, however, a number of theologians who continued in the trajectory of Reformed scholasticism (e.g., J. Edwards). In late orthodoxy (after 1725), theology “is less secure in its philosophical foundations, indeed searching for different philosophical models, less certain of its grasp of the biblical standard, […] less bound by the confessional norms of the Reformation, and given to internecine polemics” (p. 32).

In part II, we shall take up Muller’s discussion and definition of “scholasticism.”

Bibliography

Muller, Richard A. Post-Reformation Dogmatics: Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, Vol. 1, Prolegomena to Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003.

Notes

[1] This would perhaps be a similar (mistaken) move along the lines of Gilson’s exaltation of St. Thomas, which is part of Oberman’s critique and his more positive assessment of nominalism. (Although, if you are going to exalt a theologian/philosopher, Thomas is a pretty good pick : ).

Geoff H. at the church and postmodern culture blog recently posted a brief article of mine called, “Bringing Musical Insights into Conversation with Biblical Hermeneutics.” If you are interested, please join us.

In his work Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology , Thomas Clifton engages in a study of the phenomenology of music, seeking “to listen carefully to what is given, making sure that what is given is the music itself” (Music as Heard, x). Clifton seeks to avoid a view of music as chiefly symbolic or representational, and attempts to focus on the music as lived, as experienced. “It is not simply a thing in the world, but a humanly meaningful way of being, of lived experience that lies at the nexus between a human being and sound. Most importantly, music is a bodily experience in the fullest sense: a richly corporeal mode of being that integrates mind, emotion, all the senses, an entire person” (Philosophical Perspectives on Music, p. 268). According to Clifton, sound is not music, but rather is that through which music is experienced. In other words, music is not simply reducible to sounds, but is integrally connected with human experience in a kind of reciprocal relationship. As Clifton explains, “We are not the passive receivers of uninterpreted sense data, nor are we the cause of an object’s properties […] Thus, while it is true that a sonata by Mozart exists independently of me, it has significance for me to the extent that I perceive it adequately” (Music as Heard, p. 41). For Clifton is makes no sense to speak of “objective” and “universal” aesthetic standards, as different people experience the same piece of music differently. Rather than speak of music as an either subjective or objective matter, “Clifton grounds its nature and value in the lived experience of people who reside in a fundamentally human world. The result is a distinctly and laudably pluralistic account of music” (Ibid., p. 268). One of Clifton’s main concerns is that the music be allowed to speak for itself and not be silenced by theoretical layers that mute the musical experience. In light of this concern, Clifton shows how tradition musical analysis, which focuses on “pitch and interval as basic substances to which features like timbre, dynamics, and expressive qualities somehow adhere as ‘attributes,’ is misguided (Philosophical Perspectives on Music, p. 269). Here Clifton considers a few musical examples and asks, “Do we really hear col legno[1] as something simply attached to the primary substance of pitch? […] If a French horn prolongs an open E, and then quickly mutes it, is it the same E? Logically, yes; but in terms of musical behavior, I think not” ( Music as Heard, p. 6). What Clifton is highlighting then is that the so-called basic elements of music are in fact notbasic to music as lived experience. When the self-givenness of music is revealed, “what counts as lived musical experiences are such intuited essences as the grace of a minuet by Mozart, the drama of a symphony by Mahler, or the agony of Coltrane’s jazz. If we hear the music at all, it is because we hear the grace, the drama, and the agony as essential constituents of […] the music itself. It is not even accurate enough to say that these constituents are what the music is about: rather they are the music […] What the music says is what it is” (Philosophical Perspectives on Music, p. 17.

Bibliography

1. Bowman, Wayne D. Philosophical Perspectives on Music. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998.

2. Clifton, Thomas. Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1983.

Notes

[1] Literally, “with the wood.” This is a directive given to one playing a bowed string instrument to perform a particular passage by striking the strings with the wood of the bow rather than with the hair.