Williams Contra Wolter on the Affectio Iusititiae as a Pure Perfection
Thomas Williams argues in his article, “A Most Methodical Lover? On Scotus’ Arbitrary Creator,” that the affectio iustitiae implies a kind of imperfection or lack and thus cannot be applied to God. According to Scotus, both humans and angels possess wills that have two affections or inclinations: (1) the affectio commodi and (2) the affectio iustitiae. The affectio commodi or affection for the advantageous is an inclination toward the agent’s own perfection, which in the case of a rational agent is happiness. The affectio iustitiae or affection for justice allows the agent to transcend its own telos and to seek the intrinsic goodness of things for their own sake (not simply for the advantage of the agent). In addition, the affectio iustitiae serves as a check on the affectio commodi which can love immoderately. For Scotus, contra Anselm these two affections are intrinsic to the will and neither are superadded grace gifts. In fact, with the affectio iustitiae, Scotus claims that the will would not be free because it would simply act for the agents’ own advantage in a way similar to the operation of a the appetite of a non-rational animal acts to perfect its nature. In other words, the affectio commodi would reduce to a natural appetite of an intellectual nature and would be determined, not free. Wolters seems to want to argue that the affectio iustitae is a pure perfection (perfectio simpliciter), that is, that it is a perfection with no limitations or defects-something that in all cases it would be better to possess than not possess (e.g., wisdom). Since God possesses all pure perfections, God would therefore possess an affection for justice. Williams, however, disagrees, pointing out that (1) God does not have an appetite for happiness as humans do, as he is perfectly happy in himself and necessarily so. (2) God cannot love himself immoderately. (3) The possession of the affection for justice implies that the will needs to be held in check. Such a situation does not obtain in God because God does not sin. (4) Williams also argues against the interpretation that an affectio iustitiae is that which inclines an agent to love things for their own intrinsic worth. As Williams points out, God always does what he does for His own sake; hence, it seems that rather than an affection for justice, God possesses that which more akin to an affectio commodi.
Williams has significantly more to say in his lengthy article, on which I may blog in the future.
3 Responses so far
3:44 pm
Mary Beth Ingham has an article touching on this in Medioevo 20-something (2005) where she argues against Williams (without taking sides with wolter)…Dumont gave a paper criticizing both back in january, I believe (summarized in the latest bpm). The gist of it was he thought wolter too thomist, williams had little explicit textual support for his positions. so the via media.
7:29 am
Hi Lee,
Do you happen to have the (exact) names of the Ingham and Dumont papers, as I would love to read those.
What do you think about Williams’ conclusions?
Best wishes,
Cynthia
9:37 pm
Cynthia,
My library seems to have lost the Medioevo volume. apparently there are a number of scotistae running about. So all I can say is Medioevo 2005. it is an issue dedicated to scotus and also has pini’s intersting article of qq. in met. IV.1. Dumont’s is an unpublished conference paper, though he may give a version of it at the upcoming st. Bonaventure conference (coming?), or so goes the rumour; he’s listed as giving a paper on the de anima qq..
I find William’s interesting, but sometimes uncharitible in his representation and treatment of contrary opinions (I almost feel bad for Catherine Pickstock even though she deserves every bit of it), by not giving the best version, etc. Ingham argues against him, so I suppose it depends if you think she’s correct in thinking Scotus goes through substantial modification in his views on the will. ingham analyzes qq. in met. ix.15, lectura 2.12, ord. 2.6, and rep. A 2.12. here she’s going against Dumont’s theses in the “after the condemnations of 1277″ volume that Scotus did not change his mind on the will, only in his estimation of an opinion of henry. But I don’t know what dumont says about rep. II.12, nor have I read it myself. So, in other words, I don’t know. I haven’t sat down and read all this literature with these issues in mind; just skimmed a few articles for exams, and taken a class.
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