Per Caritatem

In chapter seven of his book Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, Turner begins by giving of brief summary of Radical Orthodoxy’s critique of Scotus.  According to Radical Orthodoxy, Scotus’ onto-theological downfall involves the following:  (1) Scotus believes that it is possible to demonstrate God’s existence by natural reason apart from appeal to the premises of divine revelation.  Hence, for Scotus, natural theology is possible, and he readily engages in it.  (2)  God’s existence can be demonstrated only if existence is predicable univocally of God and creatures.  (3)  In order for being to be predicable of God and creatures then we must “have available to us some concept of ‘existence’ which is neutral as between any difference there can be between the Creator and the created-the difference, namely, between ‘infinite’ and ‘finite’ being” (p. 125).  This third proposition in particular is claimed by the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy to make Scotus guilty of onto-theology.  (4) “[I]f there are any predicates predicable univocally of God and creatures, a fortiori those same predicates must be predicable univocally, that is to say neutrally, also as between any and all differences of creatures one from another” (pp. 125-126).    

Though Turner is clearly not an advocate of Radical Orthodoxy and finds a number of flaws in their claims, he does in agreement with Radical Orthodoxy hold that Scotus’s insistence that existence must be predicated univocally between God and creatures (and not analogically as St. Thomas claims) is problematic. However, Turner’s reason for this particular criticism of Scotus is quite out of step with Radical Orthodoxy’s sensibilities, viz., Turner wants to show that the existence of God can in fact be demonstrated without the necessity of a univocal concept of being between God and creatures.  Hence, for Turner, Scotus and St. Thomas (at least according to Turner’s read), natural theology is a valid enterprise. 

Quoting from the Ordinatio (1 d3, q1-2), Turner highlights two ways in which Scotus attempts to define univocity.  The first definition is summarized by Turner as follows: “‘p’ is univocally predicated so long as ‘p’ and ‘~p’ are contradictories” (p. 127).  The second definition states that in order for a deductive inference to be valid, the middle term must have the same meaning when related to the major and minor premises.  Although Scotus’s definitions seem fairly straightforward, Turner argues that Scotus’ second definition is

but a condition of deductively inferential validity which depends upon, and is not itself a definition of, the univocal predication of terms.  For of course we cannot know that a deductive inference is valid unless we know that the middle term is predicated univocally in both antecedents; hence we cannot know that the middle term is univocally predicated from the fact that the inference is valid.  To say, as Scotus does, that ‘univocity’ of meaning is that possessed by such middle terms as are required for deductive validity is to beg the question:  the determination of validity presupposes criteria for the determination of univocity, not the other way around (pp. 127-128). 

If Scotus’s second definition is amiss, then how do things stand for his first definition, viz., that a term is univocal if a contradiction results when we affirm and negate it of the same subject (e.g.,  Igor is wise, and Igor is not wise)? According to Turner, who here appeals to Richard Cross to support his claim, this definition of univocity does not state both necessary and sufficient conditions of univocity and thus is deficient as a definition.[1]Scotus gives us only necessary conditions, and, as Turner will attempt to argue in a subsequent chapter, viz., chapter ten, “there are terms, predicated of the same subject, the affirmation and denial of which are genuine contradictories, even though the affirmation and denial are related only analogically” (p. 128). 
 

Notes 

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[1] Cf. Cross, Duns Scotus, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 37.