Per Caritatem

It has been a while since I’ve posted a little philosophical humor, so here’s a good one.

 
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Scotus’ solution to the question, “whether man in his present state needs to be supernaturally inspired with some knowledge he could not attain by the natural light of the intellect?”, is found in paragraphs 57-65.  In paragraph 57, Scotus states that he will distinguish “in what sense something may be called supernatural” and ipso facto in what sense something may not be called supernatural (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 57).  He begins by giving us two ways to consider how the receptive potency is acted upon.  First, we have the relationship of the receptive potency to the informing act.  Second, we have the relationship of the receptive potency to the causing agent.   Regarding the first, the relationship can be understood as natural, violent, or neutral (i.e. “neither natural nor violent”)-all of which depend upon whether the intellect is naturally inclined to receive the form.  By “naturally” inclined, Scotus means that structurally speaking the form is (by nature) positioned to perfect the potency.  In other words, natural inclination simply describes the fact that things are naturally ordered to being perfected-things by nature move from a stage of imperfection to a stage of perfection.  Thus, a natural relationship occurs when the form perfects the potency.  When no ordering to perfection, and one might say, a repugnance is involved rather than an inclination, a violence takes place.  “It is violent, if what it suffers is against its natural inclination” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 57).  Lastly, when there is neither an inclination nor a repugnance involved, the relationship is said to be neutral and no violence occurs.  With regard to the relationship between the receptive potency and the informing, supernatural does not apply. 

The second major relationship discussed is between the receptive potency and the causing agent, and this is where we may speak of supernatural in contrast with natural.  If the agent moves the possible intellect naturally, then we have a natural cause.  If the agent cause moves the passive potency supernaturally, then we have, as one might expect, a supernatural cause. As Scotus says, “that knowledge is supernatural which is generated by some agent which by its very nature is not ordained to move the possible intellect in a natural manner” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 60).  With this claim, Scotus seems to have a broader overall context in mind than was possible for Aristotle in light of the fact that Aristotle did not have access to supernatural revelation (Scripture).  That is, I take Scotus to be stating that there is an Agent that by its very nature, which is absolutely free, uncaused, etc., freely chooses to act on the possible intellect in such a way that transcends purely natural (and hence) necessary causality.  Yet, no violence is done to the natural potency, because, the supernatural activity perfects the intellect.  Here we have an instance of Scotus applying the dictum, “grace completes, but does not nature.” 

In paragraphs 61-65, Scotus lays out two ways in which an action or knowledge could be understood as supernatural.  Scotus agrees with Aristotle that in our present state the passive intellect is moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and the phantasm.  Hence, natural cognition comes about solely by these two agents.[1]  Scotus also adds, “[v]irtute autem istorum potest haberi omnis cognitio incomplexi quae secundum legem communem habetur a viatore” (“However, in virtue of these, cognition of every term or concept [incomplexi], which according to the common law [of nature] is possessed by the wayfarer, can be obtained”) (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 61).  Regarding what is meant by incomplexi and complexi, terms or concepts are incomplexi, and propositions are complexi.  Thus, propositions (complexi) are made up of terms and concepts (incomplexi).  In the propostion, “God is triune,” we have two concepts, namely, “God” and “triune.”  What Scotus seems to claim is that supernatural knowledge is not needed for the knowledge of terms or concepts, but it is needed for the knowledge of certain propositions.  One may in fact via natural reason come to understand (not fully comprehend) the terms “God” and “triune,” and yet be unable to grasp the truth of the proposition, “God is triune.”  Scotus does say that de potentia absoluta Dei, God could by way of special, supernatural revelation bring about knowledge of incomplexi which are capable of being known naturally; however, this kind of activity is unnecessary.[2]  Then in paragraph 62, Scotus sums up why certain propositions cannot be knowable by the natural light of reason alone.  As Scotus explains,

even when the agent intellect and sense image are fully active, many propositions we need to know remain unknown or neutral [multae complexiones remanebunt nobis ignotae et nobis neutrae quarum cognitio est nobis necessaria].  The knowledge of such propositions must be given to us in a supernatural manner, because no one could naturally discover them and teach them to others, for on natural grounds alone, if they are neutral to one, they are to all (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 62). 

The previously-mentioned proposition, “God is triune,” falls under those which are necessary for us, yet remain “unknown” and hence “neutral” to us by the light of natural reason alone.     Scientific knowledge, understood in the medieval sense of scientia or demonstrative knowledge, utilizes propositions whose terms, when properly understood, contain within them the warrant for our assent.  However, as we have seen, Scotus readily acknowledges that there are some propositions (e.g., “God is triune”) whose terms do not contain within them such warrant.  In other words, the knowledge of the intelligibility of these terms when conjoined in a proposition surpasses our (natural) ability to understand them.  These types of propositions can be known through either vision (e.g., the beatific vision) or faith.  Given that Scotus is concerned in this question with what can be known in this life, we may conclude that the only way that propositions such as “God is triune” can be known is through the supernatural gift of faith.  That is, God (non-violently) causes our assent to propositions of this sort.   

Then in paragraph 63, Scotus gives us a second way in which we might call an action or knowledge, supernatural.[3]  Here supernatural knowledge can occur if the agent (i.e., God) takes the place of [supplente vicem] the object, which in the case at hand is the divine essence.[4] “For that object which is able to cause such propositions as ‘God is triune’ and the like, is the divine essence known in its proper nature [sub propria ratione cognita].  Knowable in this way, it is a supernatural object”[5] (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 63).  If one were to have the divine essence in its proper nature made evident to her, then she would know God as triune, and it seems to follow that the proposition, “God is triune” would be self-evident.  However, in this life, as Scotus explains, though our passive intellect is able to receive the divine essence by nature (which is only part of the story), the object, the divine essence, is not known by us; yet, we are able to know that “God is triune” is true.  How is this possible?  Because, as noted above, the agent takes the place of the object and causes the assent.  For Scotus, in the natural order of things, the object and the agent intellect are both active co-causes.  Cognition is understood as a function of intellectual species abstracted from sense objects.  These intellectual objects are then impressed onto our passive intellect, and these objects serve to perfect the intellect.  Because this cognitive process does not univocally apply to God, as the divine essence is not given to us via the process of abstraction from sense objects, we cannot know in the typical natural way that “God is triune.”  Hence, if this proposition is to be known, it is known supernaturally through God who causes the assent.  Scotus’ final answer as to whether nature (the natural light of reason) is sufficient for the knowledge that we require in this life seems to be sic et non.  That is, with regard to the intellect’s receptivity, it is sufficient by nature to receive the divine essence; however, with respect to the agency required to complete or perfect the needed knowledge, Scotus is emphatic that nature alone apart from divine, supernatural intervention is radically insufficient. 

Notes

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[1] “Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate, igitur sola illa cognitio est ei naturalis quae ab istis agentibus imprimitur” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 61). [2] “Deus possit per revelationem specialem cognitionem alicuius incomplexi causare . . . sicut in raptu, non tamen talis cognitio supernaturalis est necessaria de lege communi” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 61).

[3] The first way was given in paragraph 61, when Scotus speaks of God’s ability to act de potentia absoluta via supernatural revelation to bring about knowledge of that which we can know by nature. 

[4] “Aliter etiam posset dici actio vel notitia supernaturalis quia est ab agente supplente vicem obiecti supernaturalis” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 63). 

[5] “Nam obiectum natum causare notitiam huius ‘Deus est trinus’, et similium, est essentia divina sub propria ratione cognita; ipsa sub tali ratione cognoscibilis est obiectum supernaturale” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 63). 

“But in fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep. For as by a man came death, by a man has come also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who belong to Christ. Then comes the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power. For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy to be destroyed is death.  For “God  has put all things in subjection under his feet.” But when it says, “all things are put in subjection,” it is plain that he is excepted who put all things in subjection under him. When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things in subjection under him, that God may be all in all (1 Corinthians 1:20-28, ESV). 

Below are selected moments from Tom Wright’s commentary on this passage. 

“The resurrection of Jesus was the moment when the one true God appointed the man through whom the whole cosmos would be brought back into its proper order.  A human being had got it into this mess; a human being would get it out again.  The story of Genesis 1-3-the strange, haunting tale of a wonderful world spoiled by the rebellion of God’s image-bearing creatures-is in Paul’s mind throughout this long chapter” (Paul for Everyone:  1 Corinthians, p. 212).  After rehearsing a kind of mini redemptive-historical narrative, St. Paul begins to discuss the coming of God’s kingdom.  Many Jews of St. Paul’s longed for the coming of God’s kingdom-for the day when “God would become king over the whole world, restoring Israel to glory, defeating the nations that had oppressed God’s people for so long, and raising all the righteous dead to share in the new world” (p. 212).   For St. Paul, with the resurrection of Christ, this day had in a very real sense been inaugurated, yet, in a way that took him totally by surprise.  “Instead of all God’s people being raised at the end of history, one person had been raised in the middle of history.  That was the shocking, totally unexpected thing.  But this meant that the coming of God’s kingdom was happening in two phases” (p. 213).  When St. Paul speaks of each occurring “in his own order,” he has in mind both the order of events and God’s final ordering (p. 213).  The former, viz., the order of events, speaks of Jesus’ present reign as the risen Lord and King.  Yet, the “purpose of this reign-to defeat all the enemies that have defaced, oppressed and spoiled God’s magnificent world, and his human creatures in particular-has not yet been accomplished.  One day this task will be complete:  the final enemy, death itself, will be defeated (verse 26), and God will be ‘all in all’ (verse 28)” (p. 213). 

Then we move to the final ordering where we have a picture of a world “put back to rights.”  Here St. Paul appeals to two psalms, and weaves together a Messianic mosaic manifesting to us what we as <i>imago Dei</i> were created to be and do.  “Psalm 110, quoted in verse 25, is about the king whom God will place at his right hand until all his enemies are brought into subjection.  This, Paul declares, is now being fulfilled in Jesus.  Psalm 8, quoted in verse 27, belongs closely with this, speaking of God ‘putting all things into order under his feet’ [Wright's translation].  But instead of talking about the Messiah, as Psalm 110 does, Psalm 8 talks about the human being.  This role, of being under God and over the world, is not just the task of the Messiah; it’s what God had in mind from the very start when he created human beings in his own image.  This is how Paul ties the passage tightly together:  the achievement of the Messiah, and his present reign in which he is bringing the world back to order, is the fulfillment of what God intended humans to do (see verse 21).  The story told in Genesis is completed by the story told in the Psalms” (p. 214). Our enemy, death, of course plays a crucial role in this story; however, death does not have the final word.  Rather, the Final Word has the final word and death is silenced.  He is Risen!

“Then Pilate took Jesus and flogged him. And the soldiers twisted together a crown of thorns and put it on his head and arrayed him in a purple robe. They came up to him, saying, ‘Hail, King of the Jews!’ and struck him with their hands. Pilate went out again and said to them, ‘See, I am bringing him out to you that you may know that I find no guilt in him.’ So Jesus came out, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe. Pilate said to them, ‘Behold the man!’ (John 19:1-5).

Have you ever wondered why the soldiers chose a crown of thorns? After all, they could have constructed the crown from a number of other materials.  Yet, the crown of thorns seems purposed, that is, it draws us back to  Genesis and the series of curses that resulted when our first parents fell.  “Cursed is the ground because of you; in pain you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you” (Gen 3:17-18).   As Jesus begins to walk the path that leads to his death by crucifixion, we have a glimpse here of how he, the true guiltless Man, will take the curse, our curse upon Himself.  The scene is shot through with irony-Pilate, the image of a false and corrupt “king,” presenting the true King as a helpless prisoner and eventually condemning Him to die.  Likewise, we see Jesus, the Lord of creation, the perfect image of God, who unlike Adam and Eve, listened the voice of the Father in humble obedience even to the point of death on a Cross-this Jesus, Pilate proclaims is the true man (talk about meanings going beyond the intention of the author/speaker), and indeed He is-the icon of God who makes the invisible God visible, who opens blind eyes, softens hard hearts and who gives life to the dead. Yet, the One through whom all things were made and who, came to His own, finds His own in rebellion against Him.  In fact, they even weave together a crown of thorns and dress Him in a purple robe to mock Him.  What is our Lord’s response to this? Does He lash out and call down legions of angels to wipe out the rebels?  No.  The innocent, yet true King, crowned with signs of creation’s curse, stands silent and walks the path that was both His destiny and our blessing.  How shall we answer Pilate’s question, “What is truth?”  Ironically, Pilate answered it himself:  “Behold the Man!”

Turning to the second initial argument [n. 2], we have a basic modus ponens, namely, if the senses do not require supernatural knowledge (in our viator state), then neither does the intellect.  Essentially, we have an appeal to the a minori ad maius principle that if something is true of the lesser, then it will no doubt be true of the greater.  The intellect is greater than sense cognition, and if the latter has no need for supernatural knowledge for its perfection, then surely the intellect, in light of its higher status, requires no supernatural knowledge to achieve its end either.[1]   Scotus then gives his response to this argument at paragraph 93.  In sum, Scotus denies the consequence of the second argument and claims that the a minori ad maius principle does not apply in this case.  As Scotus explains, “superior natures are ordained passively to receive something greater than they can actively produce.  Consequently, their perfection cannot be achieved except by some supernatural agent.  But this is not so with the perfection of less perfect things whose ultimate perfection could fall under the action of inferior agents” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 93).The third initial argument seems to have in view the Thomistic teaching that the passive intellect must be supernaturally elevated in order to receive the divine essence (though this is not stated explicitly).[2]  First, we have a hypothetical argument, namely, if supernatural knowledge were necessary, it would be because of a disproportion between the faculty and the object.  Consequently, some kind of supplement or addition is required so that the faculty will be proportionate to the object. Then we are given a disjunctive argument followed by a modus tolens argument. That is, this additional factor required is either natural or supernatural.  If the supplement were merely natural, then all we have is a natural addition to the (natural) faculty ; thus, the disproportion with the object remains.  Hence, the addition must be supernatural.  However, if the supplement is supernatural, then a disproportion occurs between the supplement and the intellect.  Thus, in order to remove the disproportion between the supplement and the intellect, we must deny the need for a supernatural supplement.  Ergo, we must affirm that the intellectual faculty is naturally proportionate to the object.  “It is necessary to stop with the first [viz. something natural], and admit that the intellective faculty is proportionate to everything that can be known and in any way in which it can be known” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 3). 

Scotus then replies to third argument in paragraph 94.  While Scotus maintains with the Aristotlean tradition that the intellect is naturally moved by the intelligible species abstracted from sensible objects by the agent intellect, he also acknowledges that there are some propositions that Christians hold to be true that are “disproportionate the possible intellect, that is to say, the intellect is not equal to being moved [to know them] by what can be known from sense images and the natural light of the agent intellect” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 94).  Scotus concedes that there is a “something else” required so that the intellect will be proportionate to the object.  This “something else” is a supernatural agent, namely, God, who grants the soul faith and thus makes assent possible.  In other words, in contrast to propositions such as, “the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,” to which when the terms are properly understood, the natural light of reason assents,  a proposition such as “God is triune” does not compel assent apart from supernatural intervention.  Why? Because to properly grasp (insofar as we as creatures are able) the meaning of the terms “God” and “triune” and to assent to the truth of the proposition, “God is triune,” requires knowledge of the divine essence (as occurs in the beatific vision), which is precisely what we do not have in this life.   However, God, by way of the gift of faith, can and does open up a way for assent to such propositions to occur.  Not only does Scotus claim that a supernatural agent moves the intellect to assent, but he also adds that something in the sense of form does as well-”for there is the assent produced in the intellect, which is a kind of inclination in the intellect towards this object which brings the intellect into proportion with the latter” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 94).  Next Scotus brings into the discussion the idea of “obediential potency,” which speaks of the creature’s potency with respect to his Creator. As Scotus explains,

I declare that the intellect by its very nature is in obediential potency towards the agent, and thus is sufficiently proportionate to it to the extent that it can be moved by this agent.  Also of itself, the intellect is capable of the act of assent caused by such an agent and this capability is natural.  Hence, it is not necessary that it be proportioned by something in order to receive this assent (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 94, italics added).  

Scotus provides a detailed explication of his own position in paragraphs 57-65. (I shall discuss highlights of these paragraphs in the subsequent post).  For now I simply state in passing that Scotus’ answer represents a clear refusal to be confined to an Aristotelian understanding of nature and natural, as he wants to provide a broader context in which natural potencies can be perfected not only by nature (and hence necessity) but freely, by the free agency of a Triune God who is the Creator of nature. 

Notes

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[1] “If this is true of things that are imperfect, all the more does it hold for things that are perfect.  Consequently, if the inferior faculties lack nothing for their function and the attainment of their end, all the more is this true of the higher faculty” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 2). [2] According to Thomistic teaching, our passive intellect is incapable of receiving the divine essence.  As a result, we require a supernatural supplement to elevate the intellect so that it is proportionate to the intelligibility of the divine essence and is thus enabled to receive the divine essence in the beatific vision.

My friends , Aron and Dan, over at The Land of Unlikeness are hosting a Sergei Bulgakov Blog Conference (Sept 2008). Please spread the word to any potential participants.

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The (Tentative) Lineup

Cynthia Nielsen (Per Caritatem): An introduction to Bulgakov
David W. Congdon (The Fire and the Rose)
Brendan Sammon (The Well at the World’s End)
Matthew J. Aragon Bruce (Princeton Theological Seminary)
Ben Boswell
Gregory Voiles
Aron Dunlap (The Land of Unlikeness)
Dan McClain (The Land of Unlikeness)