Per Caritatem

In the prologue of the Ordinatio, part one, question one, Scotus addresses the question, “whether man in his present state needs to be supernaturally inspired with some knowledge he could not attain by the natural light of the intellect?” In other words, what Scotus seeks to understand is whether in our present, non-glorified, viator state, we are in need of supernatural revelation or divine illumination or whether the knowledge of which we are capable by means of natural reason is sufficient.  The prologue begins with a set of initial arguments pro and con [n.1-4], to which, after significant elaboration and development of various related themes, Scotus then gives his own responses [n. 90-94].  The major premise of the first argument reads, “[e]very faculty which has something common as its primary object, is as competent by nature in regard to everything contained under this object as it is with regard to what is of itself the natural object.”  Scotus first appeals to our faculty of sight, which has as its primary object color under which all particular colors fall (e.g., blue, purple, green etc.).  Then in the minor premise Scotus turns to the faculty of reason and states that it too has a common primary object equal to its power, viz., being qua being.  Ergo, we, by virtue of our faculty of reason, are able to know naturally any thing or being that exists.[1] In paragraphs 90-92, Scotus addresses the first argument given in paragraph 1.  First, Scotus distinguishes two ways in which the term “natural” may be used.  As he explains, [1] “a natural object can mean one which the faculty can attain naturally, i.e., by the action of causes that are naturally active, or [2] it may mean an object towards which the faculty is naturally inclined, whether such an object can be naturally attained or not” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 90).  In the first sense, natural/nature is contrasted with supernatural, whereas in the second sense, natural/nature is contrasted with that which is violent. Here we should keep in mind that according to Scotus’ framework, we have a receptive potency, which is related to an active potency and to a form or object received.  The active potency is responsible for infusing the form into the receptive potency. In those cases in which the receptive potency is inclined toward the form and the form perfects it, we have a natural act.  However, in those cases in which the receptive potency is repugnant toward the form/object, we have a violent act. 

In paragraphs 91-92, Scotus accepts the major premise of the initial argument in paragraph 1, but then applies his dual understanding of nature to the minor premise.  As Scotus explains, “the minor is false in regard to the object naturally attainable, but it is true in the other sense (namely, the object to which the power is naturally ordered or inclined”) (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 92).   In other words, the intellect may be naturally inclined to an object/form and able to receive it; however, this does not mean that the intellect is capable of attaining that object/form by its own (natural) power (i.e., apart from supernatural intervention).

Here Scotus opposes Aristotle and many of his medieval predecessors, as he claims that a power can by nature be inclined toward an object and yet be unable to achieve its perfection by nature alone.  As Scotus puts it, “[i]t is not unfitting that a power should be naturally ordered to an object which it cannot attain naturally by natural causes, any more than it is for a power or faculty to be ordained by its very nature [for an act] and nevertheless be unable to produce this act by itself alone” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 92).   As we shall see, Scotus claims that our receptive potency by nature is even capable of receiving the divine essence; however, he is quick to state that we lack by nature what is required to bring this about.  In other words, the intervention of an extrinsic agent is necessary for a perfection of this sort to occur.

Notes

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[1] Scotus also adds “and consequently also any intelligible nonentity, for ‘affirmation explains denial’” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 1).