Per Caritatem

Scotus’ solution to the question, “whether man in his present state needs to be supernaturally inspired with some knowledge he could not attain by the natural light of the intellect?”, is found in paragraphs 57-65.  In paragraph 57, Scotus states that he will distinguish “in what sense something may be called supernatural” and ipso facto in what sense something may not be called supernatural (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 57).  He begins by giving us two ways to consider how the receptive potency is acted upon.  First, we have the relationship of the receptive potency to the informing act.  Second, we have the relationship of the receptive potency to the causing agent.   Regarding the first, the relationship can be understood as natural, violent, or neutral (i.e. “neither natural nor violent”)-all of which depend upon whether the intellect is naturally inclined to receive the form.  By “naturally” inclined, Scotus means that structurally speaking the form is (by nature) positioned to perfect the potency.  In other words, natural inclination simply describes the fact that things are naturally ordered to being perfected-things by nature move from a stage of imperfection to a stage of perfection.  Thus, a natural relationship occurs when the form perfects the potency.  When no ordering to perfection, and one might say, a repugnance is involved rather than an inclination, a violence takes place.  “It is violent, if what it suffers is against its natural inclination” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 57).  Lastly, when there is neither an inclination nor a repugnance involved, the relationship is said to be neutral and no violence occurs.  With regard to the relationship between the receptive potency and the informing, supernatural does not apply. 

The second major relationship discussed is between the receptive potency and the causing agent, and this is where we may speak of supernatural in contrast with natural.  If the agent moves the possible intellect naturally, then we have a natural cause.  If the agent cause moves the passive potency supernaturally, then we have, as one might expect, a supernatural cause. As Scotus says, “that knowledge is supernatural which is generated by some agent which by its very nature is not ordained to move the possible intellect in a natural manner” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 60).  With this claim, Scotus seems to have a broader overall context in mind than was possible for Aristotle in light of the fact that Aristotle did not have access to supernatural revelation (Scripture).  That is, I take Scotus to be stating that there is an Agent that by its very nature, which is absolutely free, uncaused, etc., freely chooses to act on the possible intellect in such a way that transcends purely natural (and hence) necessary causality.  Yet, no violence is done to the natural potency, because, the supernatural activity perfects the intellect.  Here we have an instance of Scotus applying the dictum, “grace completes, but does not nature.” 

In paragraphs 61-65, Scotus lays out two ways in which an action or knowledge could be understood as supernatural.  Scotus agrees with Aristotle that in our present state the passive intellect is moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and the phantasm.  Hence, natural cognition comes about solely by these two agents.[1]  Scotus also adds, “[v]irtute autem istorum potest haberi omnis cognitio incomplexi quae secundum legem communem habetur a viatore” (“However, in virtue of these, cognition of every term or concept [incomplexi], which according to the common law [of nature] is possessed by the wayfarer, can be obtained”) (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 61).  Regarding what is meant by incomplexi and complexi, terms or concepts are incomplexi, and propositions are complexi.  Thus, propositions (complexi) are made up of terms and concepts (incomplexi).  In the propostion, “God is triune,” we have two concepts, namely, “God” and “triune.”  What Scotus seems to claim is that supernatural knowledge is not needed for the knowledge of terms or concepts, but it is needed for the knowledge of certain propositions.  One may in fact via natural reason come to understand (not fully comprehend) the terms “God” and “triune,” and yet be unable to grasp the truth of the proposition, “God is triune.”  Scotus does say that de potentia absoluta Dei, God could by way of special, supernatural revelation bring about knowledge of incomplexi which are capable of being known naturally; however, this kind of activity is unnecessary.[2]  Then in paragraph 62, Scotus sums up why certain propositions cannot be knowable by the natural light of reason alone.  As Scotus explains,

even when the agent intellect and sense image are fully active, many propositions we need to know remain unknown or neutral [multae complexiones remanebunt nobis ignotae et nobis neutrae quarum cognitio est nobis necessaria].  The knowledge of such propositions must be given to us in a supernatural manner, because no one could naturally discover them and teach them to others, for on natural grounds alone, if they are neutral to one, they are to all (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 62). 

The previously-mentioned proposition, “God is triune,” falls under those which are necessary for us, yet remain “unknown” and hence “neutral” to us by the light of natural reason alone.     Scientific knowledge, understood in the medieval sense of scientia or demonstrative knowledge, utilizes propositions whose terms, when properly understood, contain within them the warrant for our assent.  However, as we have seen, Scotus readily acknowledges that there are some propositions (e.g., “God is triune”) whose terms do not contain within them such warrant.  In other words, the knowledge of the intelligibility of these terms when conjoined in a proposition surpasses our (natural) ability to understand them.  These types of propositions can be known through either vision (e.g., the beatific vision) or faith.  Given that Scotus is concerned in this question with what can be known in this life, we may conclude that the only way that propositions such as “God is triune” can be known is through the supernatural gift of faith.  That is, God (non-violently) causes our assent to propositions of this sort.   

Then in paragraph 63, Scotus gives us a second way in which we might call an action or knowledge, supernatural.[3]  Here supernatural knowledge can occur if the agent (i.e., God) takes the place of [supplente vicem] the object, which in the case at hand is the divine essence.[4] “For that object which is able to cause such propositions as ‘God is triune’ and the like, is the divine essence known in its proper nature [sub propria ratione cognita].  Knowable in this way, it is a supernatural object”[5] (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 63).  If one were to have the divine essence in its proper nature made evident to her, then she would know God as triune, and it seems to follow that the proposition, “God is triune” would be self-evident.  However, in this life, as Scotus explains, though our passive intellect is able to receive the divine essence by nature (which is only part of the story), the object, the divine essence, is not known by us; yet, we are able to know that “God is triune” is true.  How is this possible?  Because, as noted above, the agent takes the place of the object and causes the assent.  For Scotus, in the natural order of things, the object and the agent intellect are both active co-causes.  Cognition is understood as a function of intellectual species abstracted from sense objects.  These intellectual objects are then impressed onto our passive intellect, and these objects serve to perfect the intellect.  Because this cognitive process does not univocally apply to God, as the divine essence is not given to us via the process of abstraction from sense objects, we cannot know in the typical natural way that “God is triune.”  Hence, if this proposition is to be known, it is known supernaturally through God who causes the assent.  Scotus’ final answer as to whether nature (the natural light of reason) is sufficient for the knowledge that we require in this life seems to be sic et non.  That is, with regard to the intellect’s receptivity, it is sufficient by nature to receive the divine essence; however, with respect to the agency required to complete or perfect the needed knowledge, Scotus is emphatic that nature alone apart from divine, supernatural intervention is radically insufficient. 

Notes

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[1] “Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate, igitur sola illa cognitio est ei naturalis quae ab istis agentibus imprimitur” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 61). [2] “Deus possit per revelationem specialem cognitionem alicuius incomplexi causare . . . sicut in raptu, non tamen talis cognitio supernaturalis est necessaria de lege communi” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 61).

[3] The first way was given in paragraph 61, when Scotus speaks of God’s ability to act de potentia absoluta via supernatural revelation to bring about knowledge of that which we can know by nature. 

[4] “Aliter etiam posset dici actio vel notitia supernaturalis quia est ab agente supplente vicem obiecti supernaturalis” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 63). 

[5] “Nam obiectum natum causare notitiam huius ‘Deus est trinus’, et similium, est essentia divina sub propria ratione cognita; ipsa sub tali ratione cognoscibilis est obiectum supernaturale” (Ord. prol., p. 1, q. 1, n. 63).