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Scotus on the Moral Goodness of an Act
Published by Cynthia R. Nielsen April 4th, 2008 in Duns ScotusScotus discerns different senses of goodness, e.g., primary or essential and secondary or accidental goodness[1]. In Quodlibet, q. 18, we read,
Just as the primary goodness of a being, called “essential” and consisting in the integrity and perfection of the being itself, implies positively that there is no imperfection, so that all lack or diminution of perfection is excluded, so the being’s secondary goodness, which is something over and above, or ‘accidental,’ consists in its being perfectly suited to or in complete harmony with something else-something which ought to have it or which it ought to have. And these two suitabilities are commonly connected.[2]
Interestingly, Scotus explains the good in each case in terms of a kind of suitability (convenientia) of which there are both proximate (the person’s judgment) and remote (the divine intellect) grounds. What I find fascinating is the way in which Scotus utilizes a number of aesthetic terms in his theory of the moral goodness of an act. For example, he speaks of the décor of an act, which is a relation or due proportion between a number of elements (e.g., power, act, object, place, time, manner etc.). In addition to this décor or due proportion of elements, right reason is also involved.[3] That is, an intellectual judgment takes place that serves as a guide and standard of what the act should be in order to be good. For Scotus, moral goodness is not a “thing”–it is not a substance-but rather is a proper relation of various elements, and hence, an accident.
Turning again to Quodlibet, q. 18, we read, “[t]he moral goodness of an act consists in its having all that the agent’s right reason declares must pertain to the act or the agent in acting.”[4] As mentioned above, Scotus appeals to an aesthetic category-what he calls “suitability” (convenientia)-to unpack his theory of moral goodness. Every agent who elicits an act does so under a certain set of circumstances. There is a suitability relationship that obtains between the act and the agent and between the act and the various circumstances that belong to the act. In other words, Scotus has in mind an integral whole-agent, act, circumstances-that can either be suitable or unsuitable.
With regard to secondary goodness, we have a distinction between subjective and objective goodness. Subjective goodness is what the agent ought to have (it is that which perfects the agent), whereas objective goodness is what the deed ought to have; it is that which is suitable to the act or deed. Lastly, an act is said to be good if it is a complete act (hence a purpose is involved).
Given that there are proximate and remote grounds of suitability, suitability is mind-dependent, that is, proper human judgment is required (i.e., “right reason”) in order for the act to be moral, and the divine intellect is required or else there would be no suitability relationships for one to discover. In sum, for Scotus, the agent via his/her intellectual judgment or right reason assesses the suitability of the various elements in each concrete situation and then acts based on that judgment (will and right reason are co-causes). If all of the elements/aspects do not obtain proper suitability relations, the act will be compromised.
Notes
[1] Regarding primary or essential goodness, I understand this to be more ontologically focused and speaks the completeness of the act. Using a negative example of blindness, when one is born blind, there is a privation involved-something that ought to be there is lacking, viz., sight. Hence, in this case we have something that is incomplete in an essential way. [2] Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America), p. 169. [3] See Ordinatio 1, d. 17, q. 9, n. 62 [Wolter, p. 167].
[4] Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, p. 169.
Hi Cynthia,
I work next door to your husband at PCPC as a pastoral intern.
What your thoughts are on how Scotus’s understanding of the moral goodness of an act relates to his nominalism?
I may be misunderstanding Scotus, but I would think that defining the moral goodness of an act in accidental terms would fit well with the nominalist view of creaturely moral goodness as arbitrary to (or not respecting) the essential character of God. In other words, it would seem to support the separation between the character of God and the law of God in his world.
Hi Jay,
Thanks for your comment. First of all, Scotus is not a nominalist–he was a realist when it comes to universals. William of Ockham, on the other hand, does hold that there are no extramental universals. Also, the character of God most definitely plays a significant role in Scotus’ moral teachings. Scotus distinguishes between natural law in the strict sense, which is either a precept that is (1) per se nota (a self-evident, analytic proposition)—its truth is evident from the meaning of the terms or, (2) a precept that can be demonstrated from such self-evident propositions. Natural laws in the strict sense are transhistorical and transcultural, and can never be revoked or altered—Why? Because this would involve God acting against his own character, his own rationality. Natural law in the extended sense consists in precepts that exhibit a kind of consonance that is objective and harmonizes with the necessary or strict natural laws. These natural laws in the extended sense, however, can be revoked by the proper authority and if the right circumstances are in place (e.g., this is how Scotus attempts to deal with cases in the Bible where it seems that God has revoked one of this own commands—the command to sacrifice Isaac). In addition, natural laws in the extended sense do not follow deductively from the natural laws in the strict sense (the is a kind of prudence at work here).
Thanks Cynthia! I confused Scotus with Ockham. Sorry.
Hi Jay,
As the Russians say, “нет проблема!” No, problem! : )
Hi Cynthia, nice post. I was intrigued by the following ” in order for the act to be moral, and the divine intellect is required or else there would be no suitability relationships for one to discover.” What role does the divine intellect play here? After all he did not endorse divine illumination.
best,
grs
Hi Garrett,
Thanks for your comment. My post was pretty sketchy, so thanks for asking me to unpack a bit.
In the excerpted passage from Quodlibet q. 18 (in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, pp. 169-70), near the end, Scotus says, “And either this suitability stems from the nature of the terms or, if it must generally be traced back to the judgment of some intellect (since the intellect is the measure of suitability), this judgment will be that of the intellect which is the rule of the whole of nature, viz., the divine intellect. Indeed this intellect, just as it knows perfectly every being, so it knows perfectly the harmony or disagreement of one thing with another.”
If I recall correctly, Dr. Frank emphasized this passage to show that Scotus is a right reason moral theorist. The right reason of the agent in other words assesses the situation and the suitability relations and in light of judging the situation suitable, acts. But what are the grounds for the suitability? As Scotus says that we have (1) proximate and (2) remote grounds for suitability. The first involves the judgment of reason by the agent, which is found in the objective nature of the elements [the relation of the terms—per se nota propositions]. Then the second, the remote grounds, (as I understand Scotus) rests in the divine order of things—the creative governing divine intellect. So it seems that the grounds of the suitability are ultimately mind-dependent. If my mind is not working properly when I am doing things, then the act can’t be a morally good or bad act. Were it not for the creative, governing divine intellect, there wouldn’t be the suitabilities for me to discover. What do you think?
Best,
Cynthia