Thanks for your comment. My post was pretty sketchy, so thanks for asking me to unpack a bit.

In the excerpted passage from Quodlibet q. 18 (in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, pp. 169-70), near the end, Scotus says, “And either this suitability stems from the nature of the terms or, if it must generally be traced back to the judgment of some intellect (since the intellect is the measure of suitability), this judgment will be that of the intellect which is the rule of the whole of nature, viz., the divine intellect. Indeed this intellect, just as it knows perfectly every being, so it knows perfectly the harmony or disagreement of one thing with another.”

If I recall correctly, Dr. Frank emphasized this passage to show that Scotus is a right reason moral theorist. The right reason of the agent in other words assesses the situation and the suitability relations and in light of judging the situation suitable, acts. But what are the grounds for the suitability? As Scotus says that we have (1) proximate and (2) remote grounds for suitability. The first involves the judgment of reason by the agent, which is found in the objective nature of the elements [the relation of the terms—per se nota propositions]. Then the second, the remote grounds, (as I understand Scotus) rests in the divine order of things—the creative governing divine intellect. So it seems that the grounds of the suitability are ultimately mind-dependent. If my mind is not working properly when I am doing things, then the act can’t be a morally good or bad act. Were it not for the creative, governing divine intellect, there wouldn’t be the suitabilities for me to discover. What do you think?

Best,
Cynthia

As the Russians say, “нет проблема!” No, problem! : )

Thanks for your comment. First of all, Scotus is not a nominalist–he was a realist when it comes to universals. William of Ockham, on the other hand, does hold that there are no extramental universals. Also, the character of God most definitely plays a significant role in Scotus’ moral teachings. Scotus distinguishes between natural law in the strict sense, which is either a precept that is (1) per se nota (a self-evident, analytic proposition)—its truth is evident from the meaning of the terms or, (2) a precept that can be demonstrated from such self-evident propositions. Natural laws in the strict sense are transhistorical and transcultural, and can never be revoked or altered—Why? Because this would involve God acting against his own character, his own rationality. Natural law in the extended sense consists in precepts that exhibit a kind of consonance that is objective and harmonizes with the necessary or strict natural laws. These natural laws in the extended sense, however, can be revoked by the proper authority and if the right circumstances are in place (e.g., this is how Scotus attempts to deal with cases in the Bible where it seems that God has revoked one of this own commands—the command to sacrifice Isaac). In addition, natural laws in the extended sense do not follow deductively from the natural laws in the strict sense (the is a kind of prudence at work here).

I work next door to your husband at PCPC as a pastoral intern.

What your thoughts are on how Scotus’s understanding of the moral goodness of an act relates to his nominalism?

I may be misunderstanding Scotus, but I would think that defining the moral goodness of an act in accidental terms would fit well with the nominalist view of creaturely moral goodness as arbitrary to (or not respecting) the essential character of God. In other words, it would seem to support the separation between the character of God and the law of God in his world.