Per Caritatem

A reminder to those of you who live in the Dallas area–I will be teaching a course on St. Augustine’s Confessions (books I-IX) during the month of June at St. John’s Episcopal Church.  The class will meet in the Parish Hall on Tuesdays from 6:30-8pm beginning next Tuesday, June 3.   For more information, you may email me at crn@pobox.com.  For those who desire to read the book while taking the course, I highly recommend (but do not require) Maria Boulding’s translation of the Confessions, which is the translation that I will be using for the course.  

To whet your appetite, here are some of the themes/topics that I plan to discuss:  the literary genre of the Confessions, the dialectic of faith and reason or philosophy and revelation as it plays out in the Confessions, Augustine’s view of education pre/post conversion, the various ways that pseudo-friendships and genuine friendships impacted Augustine’s life, the significance of the pear-tree incident and purposed biblical allusions (Gen 3), Augustine’s encounter with St. Ambrose and his acquisition of a ”new hermeneutic”, Augustine’s encounter with the Platonists (book VII), Augustine’s famous Garden-scene conversion (book VIII) where he encounters St. Paul and ultimately Jesus Christ, and Augustine’s baptism and his response to Monica’s death as it relates to the general interplay of death and resurrection (book IX).

This past semester I completed an excellent course with Dr. William Frank entitled, “Studies in Phenomenological Thought.”  Below are some reflections from the course.  I may post more in the future as well.

******* 

The term “life-world” (Lebenswelt) speaks of the world which we inhabit.  The term was birthed in phenomenology and stands over against the modern scientific view of (exact) objects.   Modern science, by way of its “methods,” presents us with a world of exact objects, which in effect presents us with two images of the world-the manifest and the scientific image.  Certain philosophers (e.g., Wilfrid Sellars) have incorporated this two-image view of the world into their philosophy.  As one might expect, given the success of modern science, such a philosophy gives priority to the scientific image and de-values the manifest image, which is only true to the extent that it either conforms to the scientific image or can be justified by it.  An example of the dominance of the scientific image in modern philosophy can be seen in the distinction between primary verses secondary qualities, where primary qualities give us the “real” truth. 

Phenomenology, however, rejects a reductionist move which wants to absorb and flatten the manifest world into scientific categories.  In contrast, phenomenology attempts to present a view that preserves the “best of both worlds.”  In order to do this, phenomenology gives an account of the intentionalities that constitute the objects of science.  Robert Sokolowski, in his excellent book, Introduction to Phenomenology, describes the process of idealization that occurs when science presents us with its ideal objects.   Science begins with a given experienced via the senses (e.g., a rough surface).  Then through a process of approximation, we project by way of our imagination a kind of “pure surface” that has no imperfections.  Eventually, we arrive at our ideal object or exact essence, which becomes the limit to which everything else of this kind is a mere approximation.  However, one must not forget the relationship of the first experience (e.g., the direct perception of the rough surface) with the projected ideal object.   Unfortunately, scientists (and some philosophers) tend to reify these human constructs, and forget that these ideal objects are works of reason constituted via a specific method and exhibit an exactitude that we do not encounter in our lived experience. 

Exact essences are then contrasted with morphological essences, which include:  perception, categorial intentions/propositions, the self, dogs, cats etc.  Regarding morphological essences, two points should be emphasized:  (1) not all morphological essences can be projected as exact essences (e.g., there is no perfect cat, perception etc.).   Imperfections are part of our experiences in the world and of ourselves, and the attempt by some in modern science (and philosophy) to eliminate imperfection and vagueness is in a sense an attempt to eradicate mystery and the hiddenness of being-a kind of move to make everything presence with no interplay of absence.

As Sokolowski points out, not only does phenomenology reject the two-world view, but it also argues that science cannot account for its own existence.  That is, science itself must rely on perception, memory etc. in order to engage in its specific work, yet it cannot account for these things (whereas phenomenology can).  In addition, the precision and exactitude demanded by science has a tendency to lead to determinism which of course has no room for choice, freedom and hence moral responsibility. 

We also have what phenomenologists call eidetic essences, which manifest a special kind of identity.  There are three levels by which we proceed in our approach to understanding what an essence is:  (1) Typicality.  We experience many things and find similarities among them.  For example, we see an X that f’s, a Y that f’s, and a Z that f’s.  All three things share the same predicate, but the predicate is not univocal in meaning.  Here all we have are three discrete observations that are similar.  In other words, the predicates only state what is similar, not what is the same.  So the f’s are just as discrete and “individual” as the X, Y, and Z.  Then we move to (2) where X, Y, and Z have the same property, f.  At this level, when I see an L, M, N, or O, I expect it to f as well.  Now we see not simply similarities but a one-in-many-ness.  This is called an “empirical universal,” which is still open to the possibility of being falsified (e.g., if I were to encounter a G that does not f).   However, once we reach (3), the eidetic universal, a necessity comes into play-all A’s, B’s, C’s etc., must f.  This is a not only a move beyond regularity and sameness to necessity, but it is a move beyond experience and is based on a work of the imagination.  For example, let’s say that you have a melody and you begin to wonder whether it is possible to have a melody that is not permeated with time, with temporal sequence. One cannot imagine such a melody-it is not possible for a melody to be without temporal succession.  So here a universal claim, viz., “music involves temporal progression,” is posited, and one attempts imagine whether it is the case that the feature in view (temporal unfolding) must always be present.   Here we are dealing with the work of nous, which, along with imagination and other factors, influences our judgment. 

Upated Information:  All slots for presenting are now full.  Many thanks to all who have responded.  The tentative line-up looks great–see below. 

*******

In the spirit of the recent “blog conferences,” I plan to host a conference in the latter part of the summer (August 1st-16th) focused on St. Augustine’s enduring influence on various theologians and philosophers from the Middle Ages to the present.

If your mini-essay was accepted, I need the finished piece by Friday, July 25th.  If you have signed up as a respondent, I will email you the mini-essay to which you have been assigned by July 26th.  After you have completed your short commentary (approximately two-three short paragraphs of critical and charitable interaction), please email it to me no later than Weds. July 30th.  Email contact:  crn@pobox.com.

Augustine and the Middle Ages

1. Garrett Smith, doctoral student, Notre Dame (Augustine and Scotus)
    Respondent:  Shane Wilkins

2. Shane Wilkins, doctoral student, Fordham University (Augustine and Henry of Ghent)
    Respondent:  Jonathan McIntosh

3.  Scott Williams, doctoral student, Oxford University (Augustine, Henry of Ghent and Scotus)
Respondent:  Garrett Smith

Augustine and the Reformation

1. Dr. Phillip Cary, Professor of Philosophy at Eastern University. Dr. Carey is a noted Augustine scholar,  whose published works include, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist; (Augustine and Luther)
    Respondent:  Dr. Joel Garver

2. Jason Ingalls, M.Div. Princeton Theological Seminary; (Augustine, Luther and Barth via Jenson’s The Gravity of Sin)
    Respondent:  Dave Belcher

Augustine and 19th Century Thinkers

1. Michael Jones, doctoral student, University of Dallas; (Augustine, Kierkegaard and Hegel)
    Respondent:  Dr. Victor Salas

Augustine and 20th-21st Century Thinkers

1. Mike Dagle, St. John’s Episcopal Church, Detroit; (Augustine and Plantinga)
    Respondent:  James Gibson

2. Bret Saunders, doctoral student, University of Dallas; (Augustine and Marion)
    Respondent:  Dr. Joel Hunter

3.  Mary C. Moorman, PhD candidate, Southern Methodist University; (Augustine, von Balthasar, and de Lubac)
    Respondent:  Dan McClain

Dr. Bruce McCormack,  Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, has written an essay focused on the Christology of the recent Historical Theological Field Committee Report issued by Westminster seminary.  Here is a excerpt to pique your interest:  (The full essay is found here).

The issue for the writers of the Historical and Theological Field Committee Report [hereafter HTFC] does not seem to lie in the use of a Christological analogy for assessing the relation of divine and human “causality” in the production of Holy Scripture; the writers are quite willing to argue for their own version of the analogy in question.  The real issue is: which Christology counts as “orthodox” for Reformed Christians?  The presumption throughout is that a simple and straightforward equation can be made between the Chalcedonian Formula and Reformed Christology.  But can it?  I will state my conclusion at the outset and then seek to explain how I arrived at it.  My conclusion is that the Christology of the writers of HTFC is certainly “orthodox” in the ecumenical sense of the word, but – ironically, given the current situation at WTS – it is not Reformed.

For Reformed Christians, it is not simply Chalcedon which defines “orthodoxy” within the realm of Christological reflection; it is Chalcedon as interpreted by the Reformed Confessions.  Or, in the case of denominations like the OPC and PCA, it is Chalcedon as interpreted by the Westminster standards.  Westminster’s Christology stands, however, at the end of a long history of confessional reflection on the person of Jesus Christ and cannot be rightly understood without careful attention to that history.

Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend this conference due to the “funding factor.”  However, it looks like an amazing line-up.  If any of you plan to attend and would be willing to record the keynote speakers via Mp3, please let me know.

The conference will be held at Oriel College at The University of Oxford, July 21-24, 2008.

For additional information about the conference, email: scotuscongress2008@gmail.com.

Speakers include:   Marlyiln McCord Adams, William Courtenay, Richard Cross, Stephen Dumont, William Frank, Ludger Honnefelder, Simo Knuutilla, Giorgio Pini

In the final section of Billings’ book, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift:  The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ, he suggests various ways in which Calvin’s theology of participation might speak into our current theological milieu.

While Calvin’s theology of participation is wide-ranging, it is distinctive in relation to contemporary discussion, because it brings together what are usually held apart:  organic images of transformation into Christlikeness by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit with forensic images of God’s free pardon; a strong account of humanity’s sin with a soteriology based on the restoration of a primal uniting communion with God (p. 196).

Throughout the book, Billings has been at pains to demonstrate that Calvin’s theology of participation, contra the claims of “Gift theologians” (e.g., Milbank) involves an inner transformation of the believer as s/he is incorporated into the Trinitarian life of God.  In other words, given Calvin’s understanding of the duplex gratia, imputation does not necessarily rule out ideas of infusion and partaking in the very life of the Triune God (including feeding on the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist).  Billings also points out the importance of the corporate dimension of the Christian life for Calvin’s doctrine of participation-being united with Christ necessarily unites us with our fellow Christians in a genuine and mystical bond.  Hence, concerns for social justice and love of neighbor are intrinsic to Calvin’s understanding of participation in Christ.

Regarding the “common ground” that Calvin’s theology of participation offers, Billings writes:

While Calvin’s theology of participation brings together what many theologies of participation hold apart, it also has a great deal of common ground with Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Eastern Orthodox theologies of participation.  Calvin’s soteriology gives a central place to the problem of sin and forgiveness, but it is not fixated on those themes.  Rather, those themes occur within a larger vision of salvation that is, in many ways, a catholic vision.  Calvin is concerned, along with key patristic writers, to affirm the goodness of creation and that redemption is a fulfillment rather than a disruption of the originally good human nature.  Calvin offers a soteriology that is Trinitarian from beginning to end, continually returning to the way in which we are united to Christ by the Spirit, revealing the Father.  Calvin’s theology of participation is both sacramental and ecclesial, emphasizing the centrality of the Word and sacraments for the life of Christ’s body, which can receive the sacraments only in the communion of the church (p. 196).

Though Calvin’s theology of participation is in many ways a rather complex combination of scriptural, patristic, and medieval teachings, it is also from another perspective very simple.  It speaks of a life of Trinitarian participation, in which one is united to Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit and receives the gift of pardon and forgiveness from the Father.  “As such, the life of faith is a life of voluntary gratitude, made possible by the God who restores to sinners what they have lost, and reunites them with God” (p. 197). 

The following is taken from a transcription of a lecture given by Alvin Plantinga.  I have at times summarized his points, but for the most part the content is his.  I have also uploaded the full transcription, which you can obtain here.  If you want to hear the lecture for yourself, click here.

As I understand Plantinga’s argument against evolutionary naturalism, he is not directing his argument against the theory of evolution itself, but rather against the problems that arise for the materialistic atheist due his/her belief in the conjunction of naturalism and evolution, viz., the position becomes self-referentially incoherent because a defeater can be established that shows that on such a position our cognitive faculties are unreliable and hence all of our beliefs are as well (including the belief in naturalism and evolution).

Plantinga opens his lecture by stating that there is a surface disagreement between science and theism, but in truth a deep concord between the two.  He also adds that there is a surface agreement between naturalism and science, but in truth a deep discord between the two.

Plantinga’s lecture centers on our cognitive faculties-the faculties whereby we have knowledge and form beliefs.    According to Plantinga, it is natural from a theistic point of view to think that our cognitive faculties are reliable.  That is, they give us for the most part true beliefs when they are functioning properly and are in the right sort of setting-when they are in the cognitive environment for which they were designed.  Plantinga thinks, however, that for the naturalist there is problem as to whether our cognitive faculties are reliable.  He argues that the naturalist has a defeater for the idea that our faculties are reliable, and that this gives him a defeater for everything that he believes, including then, the belief in evolution and naturalism.  Thus, the basic structure of Plantinga’s talk is that evolutionary naturalism, the idea that evolution and naturalism are both true, is self-referentially incoherent.  If you think that the proposition, “N&E” [naturalism and evolution are true], then Plantinga will attempt to show that there is a very good reason to doubt it and give up this belief. 

Contra certain optimistic claims by folks like Richard Dawkins, Plantinga believes that there is a problem for the naturalist, at least the naturalist who thinks that we and our cognitive faculties have arrived on the scene after some billions of years of evolution basically by way of natural selection working on random genetic mutation.  As the story goes, Richard Dawkins, according to Peter Medawar, once leaned over to the philosopher A.J. Ayer, at one of those fancy Oxford candlelight dinners and said that he couldn’t imagine being an atheist before 1859, which was the year when Darwin’s Origin of Species was published.  Dawkins went on to say, “although atheism might have been logically tenable before 1859 [before Darwin], Darwin made is possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.”  

Contra Dawkins claim that Darwin made is possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist, Plantinga argues Dawkins is dead wrong here and that the truth lies in the opposite direction.  In fact, Plantinga’s argument suggests that is not possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist or naturalist. The reason that Darwinism doesn’t allow this to be possible is that according to naturalistic evolution, the function or purpose of our cognitive faculties, is not that of producing in us true beliefs, but of promoting fitness, promoting survival, promoting survival through reproduction and reproductive fitness. If our cognitive faculties just happen to produce true beliefs that really doesn’t matter.  Rather, what counts for that perspective is what role they play in maximizing fitness. Plantinga turns to Patricia Churchland, a natural philosopher of science, who writes on evolution and such topics.  According to Churchland, “a nervous system allows the organisms to succeed in the four ‘f’s’:  feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing.” Churchland continues, “the principle chore of nervous systems [that is, a brain, for example, and the rest of one's nervous system] is to get the body parts where they should be in order that an organism survive.” So the brain and cognitive faculties serve to get the body parts in such a place that the organism may survive.  Then Churchland adds, “Improvements in [...] motor control confer an evolutionary advantage, [...] representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival.  Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.”  Her point is that from the perspective of evolutionary naturalism, what counts is one’s behavior-this is what evolution is interested in-it rewards adaptive behavior and penalizes maladaptive behavior, but it doesn’t care a bit about belief. If all of your beliefs are ludicrously false, but your behavior is appropriate, then you will survive and reproductive. On the other hand, if all of your beliefs are true, but your behavior doesn’t conduce to fitness, you won’t survive and reproduce.  What natural selection is interested in is not true beliefs or reliable cognitive faculties, but faculties and beliefs that contribute to survival. 

As Plantinga points out, Darwin himself saw the problem that Plantinga will highlight.  Darwin himself wrote in a letter to a friend, “with me the horror always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.  Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”  So Darwin has this doubt [Plantinga refers to this as "Darwin's doubt"], that is, given the origin of ourselves and our cognitive faculties, there is a real question as to whether our cognitive faculties can be reliable or trustworthy. 

Plantinga presents both a simplified and a complex version of his argument.    The simplified version is as follows.  If you are a naturalist, you will also be a materialist.  You will think that human beings are material objects-they do not have an immaterial soul, self or ego.  You will also think that your beliefs are caused by processes in your body, in particular, by neuro-physiological processes.  So neuro-physiology causes belief. It is also neuro-physiology that causes behavior.  Electrical impulses are sent down through different nerves to the muscles. The muscles contract and the result is action and hence behavior.  Thus, neuro-physiology causes both belief and behavior.  Now we can assume with respect to these creatures that their behavior is adaptive and hence that their neuro-physiology is adaptive in the sense that it causes adaptive behavior and belief.  

Now what is the likelihood that a given belief is true, given that it is produced by neuro-physiology that causes adaptive behavior?  If you think about it, it really doesn’t matter whether it is true.  Rather, what matters for survival and for fitness is that the neuro-physiology causes the right kind of behavior.  It can cause whatever kind of belief it wants to as far as natural selection is concerned. So from the fact that the behavior is adaptive, nothing follows so far about the likelihood that a given belief is true.  So what is the likelihood then that a given belief is true on the part of these creatures? Given the information that we have, which is just N&E [the conjunction of naturalism and evolution], the probability is .5-50% true and 50% false.  So you have no more reason to think it true, than to think it false. But if that is true for each individual belief, then the probability that a whole set of beliefs are true or mostly true, which would be required by cognitive reliability-by the idea that cognitive faculties are reliable-the probability is going to be very small.  Suppose that you have one hundred independent, logically and probabilistically independent beliefs. The probability with respect to each one of them that each would be true is .5.  Then the probability that three-fourths of them would be true will be very small (one out of ten thousand or so).  Hence, the probability of the reliability of our cognitive faculties given the conjunction of naturalism and evolution P(R/N&E) is low.

In Plantinga’s more complex version of the argument (which I won’t spell out here-download the transcript if you are interested in the details), he highlights four different possibilities as to how belief and behavior could be related (including (1) epiphenomenalism, (2) semantic epiphenomenalism, and (4) the idea that our beliefs cause behavior both by way of content and by way of neuro-physiology and are adaptive).[1]  On the first two possibilities (1) epiphenomenalism and (2) semantic epiphenomenalism, P(R/N&E) is low and on the fourth the  P(R/N&E) is .5 or perhaps somewhat better. If you put these all together (and there is a formula for doing so from which he spares us), the P(R/N&E) will be fairly low.  So it seems something like this reasoning regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties [P(R/N&E) is low] is similar to what conflicted Darwin. 

What Plantinga argues next is that if we accept N&E, then we have a defeater for R [=reliability of our cognitive faculties].  Thus, anyone who believes N&E has a defeater for R.  The conclusion of Plantinga’s argument then is that it is irrational to believe N&E, as the probability of R/N&E is low.  That means that if you accept N&E, then you have a defeater for R [=the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliability]. But if you have a defeater for that belief, then you have a defeater for any belief that is a product of your cognitive faculties, and of course, that is all of your beliefs.  One of those beliefs is of course N&E itself [that naturalism and evolution are true]. So you have a defeater for N&E itself.  Consequently, one who accepts N&E has a defeater for N&E-a reason to doubt it or to be agnostic about it. If s/he has no independent evidence for it, then the rational position would be to reject belief in N&E.  Therefore, N&E in the absence of independent evidence for reliability-(and he argues elsewhere that you can’t really get independent evidence for your own reliability)-in the absence of that N&E is self-defeating, and hence, irrational. It is self-referentially incoherent.

Consequently, one who is contemplating naturalism and is torn between naturalism and theism should reason as follows:  if I were to accept naturalism (and here naturalism includes evolution, N&E), I would have good and ultimately un-defeatable reasons to be agnostic about naturalism, so I shouldn’t accept it. So what we have is an argument not for the falsehood of naturalism, but for the irrationality of believing it.  The traditional theist, on the other hand, has no corresponding reason for doubting that it is the purpose of our cognitive systems to produce true beliefs, nor a reason for thinking that the probability of a belief’s being true given that it is a product of our cognitive faculties is low or inscrutable. She may indeed endorse some form of evolution, but if she does it will be a form of evolution guided and orchestrated by God. And qua traditional Jewish, Christian and Muslim theists, she believes that God is the premier knower and has created human beings in his image. 

Notes

What was the only chapter topic never altered in the many revisions of John Calvin’s Institutes?  Was it predestination?  No.  Was it his discussion of human depravity in our postlapsarian state?  Wrong again.  It was his discussion of prayer, which is also the longest chapter in the Institutes.  As Billings explains in his excellent book, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift:  The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ, Calvin opens his chapter on prayer “with a Trinitarian portrait of prayer’s significance” (p. 110).  When a person has been brought to see his or her need of Christ, which is a need for something other than what one is, a gift is bestowed-the revelation and gift of Christ Himself.   Describing this gift  as he begins his discussion of prayer, Calvin writes:

The Lord willingly and freely reveals himself in his Christ.  For in Christ, he offers all happiness in place of our misery, all wealth in place of our neediness; in him he opens to us the heavenly treasures that our whole faith may contemplate his beloved Son, our whole expectation depend upon him, and our whole hope cleave to and rest in him.  This, indeed, is that secret and hidden philosophy which cannot be wrested from syllogisms.  But they whose eyes God has opened surely learnt it by heart, that in his light they may see light (Institutes, 3.20.1, trans. Ford Lewis Battles). 

St. Augustine, arguably the most influential Christian theologian in the West, penned his Confessions while serving as a bishop in North Africa.  Although the Confessions is written unashamedly from within the Christian tradition, its message speaks both to Christians and non-Christians alike-to anyone who has experienced the pangs and pulls of a restless, unquiet heart.  In books I-IX, Augustine takes us through the winding journey of his boyhood, adolescence and young adulthood without hesitating to reveal his moral, intellectual, and other struggles and failings along the way. Through a series of encounters with various texts and individuals, both pagan and Christian, which include Cicero, the Platonists, St. Ambrose, and St. Paul, Augustine encounters Jesus Christ in a life-transforming way and narrates this experience in the famous garden-scene conversion of book VIII.   We invite you to join us at St. John’s this summer during the month of June, as we “take up and read” Augustine’s Confessions, with the hope of being transformed ourselves and entering into the life, thought and prayers of this great saint. 

Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is immense, and your wisdom beyond reckoning. And so we humans, who are a due part of your creation, long to praise you-we who carry our mortality about us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you thwart the proud. Yet these humans, due part of your creation as they are, still do long to praise you. You stir us so that praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is unquiet until it rests in you (St. Augustine, Confessions, Boulding translation).

Class details:  The class will be taught by Cynthia R. Nielsen (me), doctoral student of philosophy at the University of Dallas, and will meet at St. John’s Episcopal Church on Tuesdays from 6:30-8pm during the month of June, beginning June 3, 2008.  For more information email Cynthia Nielsen at crn@pobox.com.  For those who desire to read the book while taking the course, I highly recommend (but do not require) Maria Boulding’s translation of the Confessions, which is the translation that I will be using for the course. 

Is interpretation primarily about a relation between the reader and the subjective intentions of the author?  Might it be the case that the hermeneutical method that E.D. Hirsch espouses in his book, Validity in Interpretation, lands us right back into the egocentric predicament, as the sole goal of interpretation becomes re-producing the original subjective meaning of the author?  According to Hans-George Gadamer, Hirsch’s method misses the essential dialogical character of interpretation.  (The very fact that Hirsch proffers a “method” seems to harmonize more with modern rather than premodern or postmodern hermeneutical practices). For Hirsch, the text becomes an object of scientific investigation rather than an occasion for the interpreter to be changed by the subject matter of the text through locating its question and then being himself/herself questioned by the subject matter of the text.  Gadamer, by contrast, has a more dynamic view of understanding.  According to Gadamer, 

the real event of understanding…goes continually beyond what can be brought to the understanding of the other person’s words by methodological effort and critical self-control.  It is true of every conversation that through it something different has come to be (”Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” p. 58).  

In addition to his focus on the dialogical character of a text (emphasizing the text’s flexibility or dynamism, yet still affirming the text’s identity), Gadamer develops what he calls a “phenomenology of the game” to highlight the inadequacy of a theory of understanding that focuses solely and exclusively on the subjectivity of the author or the interpreter.[1]  In his editorial introduction to Gadamer’s Philosophical Heremeneutics, David Linge describes how, in the phenomenon of play, the player, so to speak, “loses himself” in the game-he or she is “absorbed into the back-and-forth movement of the game, that is, into the definable procedure and rules of the game.”[2] The game is not understood as an “action of subjectivity,” but rather as a “release from subjectivity.”  As Linge explains, “what is essential to the phenomenon of play is not so much the particular goal it involves but the dynamic back-and-forth movement in which the players are caught up-the movement that itself specifies how the goal will be reached.  Thus the game has its own place or space (its Spielraum), and its movement and aims are cut off from the direct involvement in the world stretching beyond it.”[3]

The structures that Gadamer finds in the phenomenology of play are then put in service of Gadamer’s attempt to develop an alternative theory of understanding–one that neither confines the meaning of the text solely to the subjective intention of the author, nor construes the project of understanding as merely an attempt to re-produce the original intention of the author.  As Linge observes, the customary authorial intention hermeneutical approach is fashioned in the image of the methodology of modern science. “Just as scientific experiments can be repeated exactly any number of times under the same conditions and mathematical problems have but one answer, so the author’s intention constitutes a kind of fact, a ‘meaning-in-itself,’ which is repeated by the correct interpretation.”[4]

Notes

 [2] Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. xxiii.

[3] Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. xxiii[4] Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. xxiv.