Thanks for posting a comment. Perhaps when you have settled in to your new home and have some time, you could do a guest post on your recent studies on this topic?

If you are interested, please email me: crn@pobox.com.

Best wishes,
Cynthia

I’d better’d get back to work! I hope to hop into this discussion soon.
Blessings,
Troy

I wonder whether Plantinga’s argument is best interpreted as a version of the new demon argument against externalism.

As I understand it, the basic idea of the new demon argument is that even in certain situations where a subject’s beliefs about the external world are false–e.g., the subject is being deceived by an evil demon or is trapped in the Matrix and has beliefs about objects that don’t really exist–nonetheless the subject’s beliefs are still justified. For example, if it seems to her that she is holding a piece of paper in her hand, then she is justified in believing this even though her belief is false, and hence not an instance of knowledge.

The problem with using the new demon argument to interpret Plantinga’s argument, it seems to me, is that doing so threatens to prove too much. I take it that Plantinga doesn’t have any problem per se with the idea that knowledge consists in true beliefs which are justified because they are produced by reliable capacities, provided that the capacities in question aren’t the result of evolution but are instilled in us by God. Yet the new demon argument holds that even if someone were being deceived by an evil demon so that none of her beliefs were products of a reliable capacity, evolutionary or theistic, she would still be justified in holding those beliefs. In short, the conclusion of the new demon argument appears to be that epistemic justification is wholly internal, not external. In particular, then, according to the new demon argument epistemic justification does not consist in having beliefs produced by a reliable capacity, even one instilled in us by God. (Perhaps those better versed in Plantinga’s views can help here.)

II. In General

The more I think about it, the more it seems to me that there is a more fundamental problem with Plantinga’s argument. The problem is related to Apolonio’s concern that Plantinga has not really given a defeater for R/N&E.

Merely logical possibilities incompatible with a knowledge claim K do not defeat K. For example, instead of having dark hair I might have been blond. (There’s a possible world in which I’m blond.)It’s also logically possible for me to be blond but to believe falsely that I have dark hair. (There are possible worlds in which my belief that I have dark hair is false.) However, none of this is any reason to doubt right now that I have dark hair. Thus merely logical possibilities do not provide a defeater to my knowledge claim that I have dark hair, or even lessen its probability.

Similarly, the evolutionary epistemologist maintains that many of our beliefs selected for survival are in fact true, so that the natural capacities producing these beliefs are largely reliable. The mere logical possibility (there being possible worlds in which it is the case) that beliefs selected for survival are false by itself is no reason to doubt that beliefs actually selected for survival are false, and hence not instances of genuine knowledge. It only shows that there is no logical connection between being selected for survival and being true, which is a fairly trivial point. Consequently, Plantinga’s descriptions of myriad possible worlds in which survival value and truth come apart don’t provide a defeater for R/N&E, or even lessen its probability.

What would a real defeater look like? In the case of my hair, it might be my having some actual reason to think I no longer have dark hair (e.g., somebody I trust standing by my bed when I wake up in the morning and exclaiming, before I open my eyes and look in the mirror, “What did little Susie do to your hair with the peroxide?!”) Or in the case of R/N&E, a real defeater might be a reason to suspect that our real-world capacities selected for survival value have, when operating under optimal conditions, yielded false beliefs 50% of the time or more. But the mere possibility/conceivability of situations in which beliefs selected for survival are false is not a real reason for doubt.

Soli Deo Gloria,

Peter

I was thinking along the lines of the new demon argument against externalism. It seems that one can take Plantinga’s argument as a form of the new demon argument.

As for the “module C produced virtuously R,” what I meant was that suppose it is true that R/N&E is low. This would mean that our cognitive faculties are generally reliable. But there could be one faculty (module C) that produced belief in R in a virtuous way, that is, it came about from a truth-conducive way. So although R/N&E is low, because belief in R came about from a reliable faculty, R is still justified and N&E does not defeat it.

Finally, with regards to possible worlds, I do think the argument holds. Again, Plantinga’s claim is that R/N&E being low defeats R. But it may be that we hit the jackpot, that our actual world is one of those improbable worlds where our cognitive faculties are actually reliable. Take this example…the probability of Sally getting a baby is one in a million. Suppose that we see Sally holding a baby. One cay say, “Well, it’s probably not hers.” But when we look at the baby, it just seems that the baby is hers. The baby looks just like her. Again, the probability is low, but it seems that one can still say that the baby is hers.

In Christ,
Apolonio

The non-propositional example is clear, but would you unpack your first sentence–”As I think of it now, it seems to me that Plantinga’s argument against naturalism would be a good argument against naturalistic externalism and even an argument for naturalistic internalism. ”

Also, regarding your previous comment, do you think that in thisworld, the argument holds (given that most scientists are really concerned with this world and could really care less about possible worlds as do some philosophers)?

I don’t follow what you mean by “But module C produced virtuously R. S can still hold S because of module C.”

Thanks,
Cynthia

As I think of it now, it seems to me that Plantinga’s argument against naturalism would be a good argument against naturalistic externalism and even an argument for naturalistic internalism.

As for the non-propositional evidence, I think a Reidian response would be good. R is just another example of a properly basic belief. So a person can have so many evidences against R, but the basicality of R is so strong that it just defeats all the other evidences. For example, a husband just knows when his wife is angry. A person can make up arguments against this, but he just knows. Same with R.

Good point about the internalist/externalist distinction. What would be an example of non-propositional evidence in this case–i.e., non-propositional evidence that would be acceptable for a materialist/naturalist?

I do have the book you mentioned (Naturalism Defeated? ed. by Beilby), but haven’t read all of it.

Thanks for your comment,
Cynthia

You might want to check out James Beilby’s book Naturalism Defeated? It has many responses from many philosophers and Plantinga responds to them.

My main problem with the argument is that although P (R/N&E) is low, it does not necessarily defeat R. Suppose you have X amount of possible worlds. Given N&E, R is low. In W1, it may be that R is false. In W2, it may be that R is false. But it may be that in W321, R is reliable. It doesn’t mean that R is low given N&E. It just means that there is a world where R may still be true. Or suppose that S’s cognitive faculties are unreliable. But module C produced virtuously R. S can still hold S because of module C.

Now, Plantinga believes, as Nunely said, that N&E defeating R is not so obvious (I’m taking Nunely’s word for this). If that is so, that it is not obvious to S that N&E defeats R even though it is low, then S is still rational for believing R. If we should believe what seems to us, then S should continue believing R and it is epistemically appropriate for him to do so. Suppose that S, given 10 instances, believes that crows are black (H). It may be that H/E is high, but it does not mean that H is true or that E defeats ~H. It may be that for T, 30 instances would make him believe H. I don’t see T being irrational for not holding H given E10. It’s rational for S, yes. But not irrational for T. T may even say that H/E10 may be high. But if it is not obvious or seems to her that H given E10, then I don’t see why he has to believe H. (I got this example from Gideon Rosen) This argument works for the internalist though. If you’re externalist, you may not be persuaded. But the jury is still out on externalism/internalism.

Finally, it could simply be that there is a non-propositional evidence for R. So although N&E makes R low, N&E plus non-propositional e can make it high enough.

I appreciate your perspective and certainly do not think that the objections that you raised are not important. As I said, I share similar concerns and more or less held a similar position for some time (that I outlined as possibly being your position). At this time, I am leaning more and more toward what I referred to as the position outlined by Turner, but I still think that questions that Milbank and company raise (as well as the Reformed tradition) are important and need to be taken seriously. As far as being inconsistent–join the crowd–aren’t we all: ). I’m sure that if you read posts from me a year ago, you might wonder if the same person who is writing now was writing then.

Best wishes,
Cynthia