On a more practical level, you have no idea how much trouble this (ie – forget that these ideal objects are works of reason constituted via a specific method and exhibit an exactitude that we do not encounter in our lived experience) is in industry. Butting heads with geologists and others who look to the model for guidance on the real geology, instead the other way round, has been a real issue – and millions of dollars have been lost by companies who employ these “idealistic” folks. In a recent course, therefore, I was much appreciateive of the lecturer who kept reiterating – you’ve got to go where the geology (in context – the rocks) leads you, and nothing else. Especially in geology (mining and exploration) it is absolutely imperative to divorce your mind from the ideal concept to the observed reality, and NOT to over-interpret.

Thanks for your university address. I will send a copy to you there. The book should be out later this year.

Good luck with your St. John’s Summer Study on St. Augustine and the Augustine Blog Conference. Both events promise to be intellectually stimulating.

Best to you,

Peter

As usual, you make a number of excellent points. Given that I have only a basic grasp of Heidegger’s work and have not read the books by Husserl that you mention, I am not really qualified to speak to the issues that you raise; however, your point about the the need to be clear on the different kinds of phenomenological analyses and the differences that each manifest makes good sense to me.

Please do send me a copy of your book–I am sure that I would enjoy it and learn a great deal from it. Just send it to me via my university address:

University of Dallas (Dept. of philosophy)
Att: Cynthia R. Nielsen
1845 E. Northgate Dr.
Irving, TX 75062

Best wishes,
Cynthia

p.s. Yes, it is William A. Frank, our resident Scotist and one of my favorite professors at UD.

By any chance, is your Dr. Frank the same William A. Frank who edited Allan B. Wolter’s translation of Duns Scotus on the Will & Morality? If so, then kudos to him. That book holds a prized position in my library. Indeed, phenomenologically speaking it lies “ready to hand” on my desk, just to the left of the computer on which I’m typing these words!

Your investigation of how phenomenology might address philosophical concerns is very worthwhile. I would make two observations.

First, it is important to keep in mind that there are a number of different forms of phenomenological analysis. The phenomenology of Husserl in Logical Investigations differs significantly from that of his Cartesian Meditations, let alone the phenomenologies of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, the Heidegger of Being and Time, and the Heidegger of On Time and Being. All of these thinkers claim to be doing phenomenology–yet they each seem to be doing quite different things. Husserl would sneer at the idea that Heidegger is doing phenomenology when he speaks of “Appropriation”; while Heidegger would insist that all along, early and late, he has been doing phenomenology (which is exactly what he does insist in “My Way to Phenomenology”).

Second, to see how phenomenology might engage philosophical concerns it is important to consider how a particular phenomenological paradigm might shed light on, or even resolve, a specific philosophical problem. For example, one might try to apply the kind of phenomenological analysis of equipment Heidegger conducts in B&T to a particularly forceful formulation of the egocentric predicament, such as the argument for doubting that there are other minds that can be extracted from Descartes’s First Meditation. (I’m just using this as an example; there might be any number of specific confrontations to explore.)

Early Heidegger, in his Habilitationsschrift on the Categories of Duns Scotus (actually based on Thomas of Erfurt’s work Grammatica Speculativa), raises a phenomenological concern about theories of categories similar to your point about taking ideal objects as more real than actual objects of our experience. Specifically, Heidegger worries that traditional Scholastic categories lack experiential content, which is problematic because the categories in question supposedly apply to beings we encounter in everyday experience. If one’s way of carving up the world of experienced beings has little if anything to do with how we actually experience those beings, then, young Heidegger would say, so much the worse for one’s way of carving up the world.

Currently I am proofing a book I’ve written on Heidegger and Philosophical Atheology that will be published by Continuum Press. In the book, which is written from a neo-Scholastic perspective, I address some of these issues more thoroughly. If you’d like, I’d be happy to mail you a free copy when the book comes out. I think you’d find it interesting. I could send it to you care of your department.

Best to you,

Peter

Below are more of my reflections on Frank’s reflections of Sokolowski’s reflections : ).

What I was trying to get at in my previous comment is that the ideal objects of science have a tendency to be viewed (by some scientists and some philosophers) are the “most real” things. So not only are these ideal (mental) objects reified but they are privileged above what we experience in our everyday lives. Phenomenology in contrast has a way to uphold rather than dichotomize the manifest and scientific image because eidetic essences are not more real than what we experience. As Sokolowski notes, “what we find in an eidetic intuition should confirm the empirical truth and not subvert it. The empirical universals serve as a control on our imagination” (p. 183). When we try to reach what is essential to or a necessary feature of a thing, we are not projecting an ideal object, which is supposedly “more real” than what we experience (e.g., the ideal melody—which seems to cancel itself out, as it would have to be a-temporal and static to be the “melody Itself” to use Platonic parlance). It is true that imagination and projection are used in both (scientic and eidetic essences), but it seems that the latter avoids the dichotomies so prevalent in many modern scientific methodologies and most of modern philosophy.
This then relates to your last paragraph and the possible ways phenomenology might be relevant to philosophy. Here are three broad areas (with some overlap) that seem to me to be an important contribution of phenomenology in light of many of the problems found in modern philosophy.

First, as I said before, phenomenology does not separate reality and appearances but sees the two as integrally connected. Phenomenology stresses the togetherness or belonging-ness of mind (subject) and world (object)—the two are moments of one another. Phenomenology also stresses the intelligibility and identity that is proper to things, which is a realist emphasis rather than idealist. Instead of understanding a split between reality and appearances (as we find preeminently in Kant), phenomenology views appearances of objects as a part of their being. These intelligible objects with their objective intentional structures are given to us as datives of manifestation, and we actively attend to these structures (we make judgments, selectively perceive, confirm and disconfirm evidence etc.). Not only does phenomenology reject the appearance/reality dichotomy, it also rejects the Cartesian notion of ideas “in” the mind, which leads to the problem of the relation of these ideas to the extramental world—the egocentric predicament and the problem of solipsism. Regarding the subject/object split and the egocentric predicament, phenomenology’s central notion, intentionality, provides a helpful way to understand how mind and world are moments of one another (and thus dissolves the dichotomies just mentioned).

Secondly, phenomenology speaks of intersubjectivity as (1) our knowledge of the world which is held in common and (2) our knowledge of others. With (1), phenomenology turns to the things in the world (again a realist, not an idealist move), which we experience as experienced by others. I do not experience an other’s experience, but we both experience the same world (e.g., we can remember the same event, see the various sides of a cube from different perspectives, experience others as having bodies and thought processes similar to our own, etc.).
Thirdly, phenomenology stresses that the objects themselves have their own intentional structures that are disclosed to us as datives of manifestation—they as well as I are perfected in the knowledge act. Thus, we do not constitute the intelligible structures of our objects of knowledge, rather, they disclose themselves to us and we actively engage them through our intentional activity. Again, subject and object belong together.

Best,
Cynthia

Instead of speaking of “Frank’s contrast/point” I should have acknowledged that you posted your own reflections on material presented in Frank’s course. Maybe you were picking up on the drift of his thought, though.

Peter

Thanks for the clarification.

Arguably, another morphological essence allowing identity-in-difference is personal identity. I am the same person as I was twenty years ago, even though many of my features have changed over time.

I still wonder whether Frank is overstating the contrast between the exact essences of science and the eidetic essences of phenomenology. Certainly we experience melodies in our everyday life as temporal. But we also experience surfaces in everyday life as extended in space, which is a necessary property of the pure surfaces postulated by theoretical physics. Consider other scientific essences, such as horseness (Equus caballus). Being a horse entails being a large-hooved mammal, which is something we experience. Just as the exact essence of being a pure surface abstracts from the roughness of a particular surface, the eidetic essence of being a horse abstracts from the sleekeness or manginess of a particular horse.

Maybe Frank’s point is that idealizations, whether exact or eidetic, shouldn’t automatically be projected onto reality as if they were literal facts. Otherwise, we wind up with a plethora of abstract objects–pure surfaces, perfect circles, the Form of horseness, etc.–floating around in some mysterious Platonic third realm, since obviously they don’t exist in everyday reality. But the dangers-of-idealization point applies to phenomenologists no less than it does to scientists. (Think of Husserl’s transcendental ego in the Cartesian Meditations. Certainly selves in the real Lebenswelt aren’t like THAT!)

The material you’ve shared raises the more general issue of whether phenomenological concerns are relevant to philosophy. I myself think they are. To use one of Frank’s examples, if somebody has a theory according to which only primary properties are “out there,” then that theorist owes us an explanation of why we experience colors and other secondary properties to be “out there” too. Does the theorist believe that there some process of “projection” here, and if so then how does it work?

It would be interesting to hear what people have to say about what, if any, bearing phenomenological concerns have on philosophy–particularly philosophical theology.

Best to you,

Peter

Actually these are my thoughts/reflections on material covered in Frank’s course. You point out a mistake in the original post, which I have now corrected. The more precise contrast is rather between exact essences and morphological essences. Morphological essences allow for identity-in-difference, as the many appearances/interpretations of e.g., a musical piece, still retain a common identity. The appearances/interpretations are part of the “being” of the piece and the (non-repetitious) identity is found in the (in case of music) each (different) performance/interpretation. However, regarding eidetic essences and the exact essences of science, it still seems to me that there is a significant difference here, viz., we experience in our every day life all melodies as temporal (the manifest image is not downgraded), whereas the ideal essences of science are never experienced but are only “found” in the scientific image and only “imperfect” copies are experienced in our everyday life (the manifest image is downgraded).

Best,
Cynthia

Thanks for posting this material from Dr. Frank.

Frank contrasts what he calls the exact essences of science with the eidetic essences recovered through phenomenological analysis. Yet the eidetic essences of phenomenology seem no less ideal than the exact essences of science. Just as the pure surface of physics abstracts from the roughness of any actual surface, the eidetic essence of melody abstracts from the specific notes of any actual melody. In both cases there is a process of idealization aimed at laying bare necessary features of the object in question(for a surface, being extended; for a melody, being temporal). Why is phenomenology as the search for eidetic essences any less reductionist and “flattening” than science as the search for exact essences? I’m not sure I’m following the contrast Frank wants to draw here.

Best to you,

Peter