Per Caritatem

Scotus makes a distinction between natural law in the strict and extended sense.  A natural law in the strict sense is either a precept that is (1) per se nota (a self-evident, analytic proposition)-its truth is evident from the meaning of the terms or, (2) a precept that can be demonstrated from self-evident propositions.  In addition, natural laws in the strict sense are transhistorical and transcultural and can never be revoked or altered.  In contrast, natural law in the extended sense consists in precepts that exhibit a kind of objective and reasonable consonance or harmony (convenientia) in relation to the necessary or strict natural laws. The natural laws in the extended sense, however, can be revoked by the proper authority (e.g., God) and when the right circumstances are in place.  In addition, natural laws in the extended sense do not follow deductively from the natural laws in the strict sense. 

With regard to the distinction between natural law in the strict and extended senses, Scotus is attempting to give a reasonable account of the changing dispensations presented in Scripture.  In other words, rather than dismiss the accounts of bigamy or of God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, Scotus treats these events as true, literal, historical happenings that must be reasonably explained or else God’s character might be called into question.  (Clearly, there might be other hermeneutical moves that Scotus could have made, but those are not the focus of this discussion; however, if you want to suggest them, feel free to do so in the comment section).

As was mentioned above, natural law in the extended sense does not have the same kind of necessity and unalterability as is the case with natural law in the strict sense.  Rather, the knowledge of natural laws in the extended sense is similar to prudence in that these laws cannot be deduced with necessity from other propositions.  Yet, Scotus does not deny but rather defends the idea that divine rationality still grounds the truth of natural laws in the extended sense.  Things get interesting when we come to cases in which a new command from God seems to contradict a prior divine command.  For example, the divine command given to Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, seems to violate the previously given divine law, “Thou shall not kill.”    These are the kinds of situations with which Scotus is wrestling, as he asks, “what do we do with the fact that there are cases in which it seems that God either commands or allows murder, adultery, and bigamy, all of which are offenses against commandments in the second table?  In other words, the question of whether God can dispense with his prior commands becomes an issue.  Here Scotus’ distinction between natural law in the strict sense (necessary and unalterable laws) and natural law in the extended sense provides a way to give a reasonable account for the changes that also safeguards the character of God (and takes the changes at face value).  Clearly, God cannot dispense with natural laws in the strict sense (as these are universal and necessary) without denying his own fundamental rationality.  Thus, if natural laws in the extended sense can in fact be dispensed with, then they must possess a different kind of logical status-which is exactly what Scotus claims. 

If we take the examples of bigamy/polygamy in the Old Testament, where God seems to have dispensed with the command “do not commit adultery,” as this is part of broader understanding of marriage as monogamous, then according to Scotus we must (1) examine the ends to be served in marriage and (2) see whether there are historical circumstances that cause one of the ends to frustrate the other in a way that the higher or essential end is thwarted.  As Scotus argues, there are two (independent) ends/goods served in marriage that are hierarchically arranged:  (1) the procreation and proper rearing/educating of children, and (2) a protection against or means to avoid fornication.  (Whether these, particularly the second, are satisfying is another question).    If historical circumstances arise such that the procreation of children, which is the higher of the two ends, will not be fulfilled, then the lesser end (in this case fidelity) may be dispensed with in order to bring the higher end to completion.  Scotus, however, is clear that such a judgment to serve the higher end at the expense of the lower must be done in accord with right reason and that such a judgment occurs because of our fallen state-i.e., the circumstances evincing these decisions are negative and not ideal.  Moreover, there must be some divine approval or authoritative confirmation of the judgment; hence, right reason alone is not sufficient. 

For Scotus, we have a general order in which sets of suitability relationships obtain, and this is the (created) sphere in which right reason ranges. Scotus’ claim is that God can dispense from the natural law in the extended sense and that this is not contradictory because these precepts do not follow necessarily from God’s nature.  Moreover, having shown that natural laws in the extended sense are of a different logical status than natural laws in the strict sense, Scotus is not only able to show that God does not act in a contradictory manner in allowing dispensations, but Scotus is also able to preserve God’s freedom because God’s relation to the world is a contingent, not a necessary relation.  Here it seems to me that Scotus’ teaching on synchronic contingency plays a crucial role.  That is, with respect to the entire created order which now is, it is possible that it might not be.  In other words, God did not have to create the world, but freely out of his own goodwill and pleasure, choose to do so. Contrary to Aristotle’s teaching of diachronic contingency in which once X occurs the possibility of its opposite is ruled out, Scotus’ teaching says that in the instant that one thing is, the possibility of its opposite is not lost but continues.  Thus, we see that the natural laws in the extended sense are true, but it is also the case that they could be otherwise.  This, so it seems, can only be the case in a Christian universe in which God freely creates and in which all forms of necessitarianism must be dismantled.  A proper (Christian) understanding of divine freedom is thus the common thread weaving not only these two teachings of Scotus together in harmonious unity, but a number of his other teachings as well.