Scotus stresses that the primary adequate object of our intellect is the transcendental concept of being, an imperfect and indeterminate concept, though a concept determinable to more perfect concepts. Here it seems Scotus’s modal distinction plays a crucial role. As Peter King explains,

[t]he modal distinction reflects a reality within a given intrinsic mode, and there is no conception of the mode apart from the reality of which it is a mode.  Hence, the modal degree of being does not point to a real factor different from being itself that could be the foundation of composition in God (”Scotus on Metaphysics,” in the Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, pp. 56-57).

For Scotus, formal and modal distinctions mark out real, non-mind dependent differences within one being/thing.  These distinctions are real in the sense that they exist in the thing prior to the activity of the mind; however, the things distinguished cannot exist apart from each other.  Hence, the formal distinction is often said to be less than a real distinction because it applies to a single thing rather than distinguishing two independently existing beings (e.g., Socrates and Plato); yet, it is more than a mere conceptual distinction, as a formal distinction is not simply the result of the activity of the mind but corresponds to distinct realities in the (one) thing.  The foundation for intelligibility of the distinction, in other words, is based in the thing itself (ex parte rei), not in the mind. Among Scotus’s examples of formal distinctions, we have the distinction between the soul and its faculties (intellect and will) and the distinction between the Persons of the Trinity and the divine essence.   With these examples, we can begin to make sense of Scotus’s claim that formal distinct entities are really identical (yet formally non-identical) because they cannot actually exist apart from the same individual but only as united with that individual.  Yet, as King notes, “real identity does not entail complete sameness” (p. 22).

A modal distinction is likewise “real” in the broad sense noted above; yet, as a distinction, it has a status less than that of a formal distinction.  Again, the modal distinction, like the formal distinction reflects the realities themselves and is not simply a distinction in reason.  According to King, “[t]he core intuition behind Scotus’s modal distinction is, roughly, that some natures come in a range of degrees that are inseparably a part of what they are, and that this is a fact about the way things are rather than about how we conceive of them” (p. 25).  By way of analogy, consider how the same color (pink) can have different degrees of brightness (hot pink).  A particular color remains that color whether or not its degree of brightness differs; thus, degrees of intensity do not serve as differentia between colors.  Rather, these degrees of intensity are what Scotus calls “intrinsic modes,” and these modes tell us how each thing exists (p. 25).  To say then that God’s intrinsic intensity of being (and his alone) is infinite is to claim (among other things) that God can know or cause an infinite number of things simultaneously (as both infinite knowledge and infinite power would be required for such an act).

At least two important conclusions follow from what I’ve sketched above by way of King’s comments:  (1) God’s simplicity is upheld, and (2) God and creatures are in fact diverse and not merely different-if the latter were the case, God’s transcendence would be weakened because “there would be some real factor common to God and creatures” in light of Scotus’s univocity (of the concept) of being thesis (p. 56).   However, this is not the case.  Again, turning to King, we read:

although formal distinctions may introduce real complexity, they only introduce real composition when they are combined as genus and differentia.  In this case, there are elements united as potency (genus) and act (differentia), making up a composite.  But unless distinct elements are so related, they will not produce composition in the relevant sense, and so there need be no composition introduced by the formal distinction (p. 56).

In other words, Scotus’s univocity of being thesis does not construe being as a common genus shared by God and creatures.  Rather, we begin with the most indeterminate concept of being as that which is not repugnant to existence. As this imperfect concept becomes more precise (more perfect), we find that it has intrinsic modes (e.g. either infinite or finite), which refer to real aspects of being, viz. a being’s intrinsic intensity.  For Scotus, however, there is only One Reality that corresponds to the concept of infinite being, the Triune God.  Every other existent being falls under finite being; hence, the two realities are diverse.  In sum, the transcendental concept of being, while being a unified concept, picks out or refers to realities which are diverse, and is set forth as a disjunctive proposition:  Being is either finite or infinite.  Here Scotus exhibits a non-Parmenidian impulse and resists the urge to press all of reality into One unity.  In other words, Scotus is comfortable with a reality that ends up reflecting many diversities-diversities which of course find their ultimate unity in relation to God.