[Part I, Part II]
Next I turn briefly to Prentice’s claim regarding the similarity of purpose in the Proslogion and the De primo principio.  Here Prentice states that both works have more or less the same goal, but the way they attempt to accomplish those goals are somewhat different.  Both works aim to articulate a clear, tightly knit, valid argument that would establish by reason alone God’s existence (and nature), and which would then serve as a basis for further proofs of God’s attributes.[1] Unlike Anselm’s, Scotus’s argument, however, is not an a priori proof, or more specifically, what Wolter calls a demonstration propter quid. Rather, Scotus moves in an a posteriori fashion; yet, his argument, which Wolter calls a quia demonstration, does not lose any of its demonstrative force.  An additional difference between the two works has to do with the scope of what each proposes to accomplish.  That is, Anselm’s purpose includes an attempt to “establish whatever we believe about the divine substance, whereas Scotus restricts himself to establishing only those attributes which can be discovered by human reason alone.”[2] Because Anselm and Scotus begin with differing views as to the relation between faith and reason, the former allowing a more blended view and the latter holding a sharp distinction between the two, it is not surprising that the scope of Scotus’s purpose is much more limited than of Anselm’s.  Scotus, in other words, self-consciously pursues a project that is “purely” philosophical from start to finish.  Consequently, Scotus makes every effort to construct arguments whose premises are not taken directly from divine revelation.[3] In addition, Prentice highlights the fact that Anselm held a theory of divine illumination, whereas Scotus had offered a strong critique of such theories, particularly divein illumination as expressed by Henry of Ghent.  With these differences in mind, Prentice suggests that Scotus sees himself as carrying out a project similar in purpose with Anselm; yet, because of Scotus’s philosophical context as a “late Aristotelian scholastic” he endeavors to “achieve the high ideal” proposed by Anselm but “by human keeping to human reason alone and without the aid of illuminationism.”[4] In short, the Proslogion serves as a kind of “general model” for the De primo, but the model is adapted to fit Scotus’s desire to present “‘purer’ philosophical conclusions, with the aid of a more highly developed philosophical knowledge and technique.”[5]

Notes

---

[1] Prentice, “The ‘De Primo Principio’ of John Duns Scotus as a Thirteenth Century ‘Proslogion,’” pp. 86-87.  As Prentice notes, Anselm’s “single argument is found in his famous ‘ratio’.  On the basis of the concept of ‘that than which a great cannot be conceived’, he first shows the existence of God.  Then, basing himself on the ‘ratio’, he proceeds to describe the nature of God.  God, he says, is a necessary being, the self-sufficient origin of all things, and in short is everything which it is better to be than not to be” (p. 87).  Scotus’s purpose is similar, as “[h]e intends to give a compendium of natural knowledge of God which would include a proof for the existence of God and the deduction of the divine attributes” (p. 87). Perhaps one might say that the notion of essential order is the single “ratio,” which, as Prentice claims, serves as the “means for unification” of Scotus’s proof (p. 87).   There are, however, certain divine attributes that Scotus believes (contra Anselm) cannot be demonstrated by natural reason alone (e.g., God’s omnipotence and mercy).

[2] Prentice, “The ‘De Primo Principio’ of John Duns Scotus as a Thirteenth Century ‘Proslogion,’” p. 89.

[3] As Prentice explains, “[b]oth authors begin with a definition of God provided by the faith.  St. Anselm uses the definition:  ‘that than which a greater cannot be conceived’, which he says he accepts from the faith (cf. Pros. Ch. 2, also Response to Gaunilon ch. 1).  Scotus, in turn, starts with the definition:  ‘I am who am’ as revealed by God to Moses.  With St. Anselm, however, the definition is assumed as a systematic presupposition, whereas, with Scotus, the definition is assumed only on the psychological level and does not enter the system intrinsically.  Thus St. Anselm may use faith (and possibly also illuminationism) not only as a stimulus but also as a premise, with the result that he can speak, e.g., of the justice and mercy of God, of the Holy Trinity and of the blessed.  But since Scotus retains this definition only on the psychological level, he cannot allow faith to enter his system as a premise, and accordingly there will be divine attributes accessible to St. Anselm which are not accessible to him” (”The ‘De Primo Principio’ of John Duns Scotus as a Thirteenth Century ‘Proslogion,’” p. 89).

[4] Prentice, “The ‘De Primo Principio’ of John Duns Scotus as a Thirteenth Century ‘Proslogion,’” p. 89.

[5] Prentice, “The ‘De Primo Principio’ of John Duns Scotus as a Thirteenth Century ‘Proslogion,’” p. 89.