Thanks for your thoughtful comment. It’s been a while since I’ve read the Timeaus and Symposium, so I can’t really comment on those, except to say that in my vague memory of the latter, it still seems that one might be able to argue that the beautiful things in the world serve as mere occasional causes to get one to Beauty Itself. If so, the sense particulars serve a purpose, but are eventually to be discarded for the Form. Hence, a dualism charge might stand. Again, its been some time since I’ve read that dialogue, so I hold that view loosely. Regarding the Republic, what do you think of Bernard Williams’ critique of the city-soul analogy. As you know, the city-soul analogy implies that there is a tripartite structure on each side: the city has three parts, so the individual has three “parts.” Williams says that this cannot be true of the city and that the whole idea is incoherent. Why? When it comes to the city, it implies that there is a class of citizens (bronze-souled people) who in some sense lack reason and are irrational for the most part. However, Williams argues that this is an incoherent account because the artisans, in order to obey orders, must possess and regularly exercise reason; hence, they can’t be mostly controlled by “desire” even to the exclusion of reason. Regarding the tripartite structure of the soul: reason (gold), spirit (silver), and desire (bronze), Williams asks whether these parts are truly separated from each other in the way the analogy suggests. Even if one granted the possibility of a human as an, as it were, “irrational animal”, Williams claims that the analogy is still incoherent on the side of the city for the same reason mentioned above: the bronze-souled class receive orders from the gold-souled rulers or from the silver-souled auxiliaries and in order to receive and carry out orders, they must be rational (but the masses seem to be exceedingly lacking when it comes to reason on Plato’s elitist account). The same problem emerges for the individual soul due to the rigid separation and compartmentalization of each part of the soul. E.g., we have one part, reason, which is said to rule the other parts. However, if the desire part of the soul is inherently irrational, how can it obey reason? Conversely, there is a problem with reason. Because reason is so separated from desire, it has no real impetus to give commands. When I give you a command, I do so because I desire/want you to accomplish something for me. If I had no desires, how could I issue a command? So desire is the impetus in human activity; however, reason on the tripartite model is bereft of desire; hence, it has no impetus. I imagine that Williams’ critique would be see as overly literally by many, but then again there might be something there…

Blessings in this Advent season,

Cynthia

Yes, it’s the first pages of the Phaedo that invite a dualistic interpretation: the soul as “chained” to the body, and philosophy as preparation for death. If that’s all that we had to go on, Plato would seem very close to Gnosticism. But the tripartite soul in the Republic is all about the possible unity and harmony between appetites (i.e. the body) and thumos (”ego”) and rational part. This unity is achieved by all three parts recognizing that only the rational part is in a position to provide leadership for the whole. So the appetites seem not to be inherently antagonistic to reason. Likewise, the agenda of the Rep as a whole is focused on this life, and not on what happens after death. Then in the Symposium we get an account of “love” (from Diotima) that describes it as a continuum from mere (”bodily”) lust up through the most exalted spiritual experiences. The whole drift of the argument seems to be against any dualistic opposition between body and soul. And in the Timaeus, similarly, the demiurge and the gods under his direction make it their business to make the physical world as much like themselves as possible. Again, not an antagonistic relationship. Of course the Forms, with their possibly “separate” existence, are the focus of Aristotle’s critique of Plato. But when Plotinus locates the Forms in the mind of God, and interprets God’s relation to the physical world along the lines of the Timaeus (via “emanation” and return), this seems a reasonable way of supplementing Plato’s texts. And it involves no antagonism; no “chaining,” or need for “escape.” My own guess would be that the initial pages of the Phaedo represent Plato’s most traumatized response to the death of Socrates, and that the Rep, Symp and Timaeus represent his more mature view. I arrived at this way of reading Plato mainly with the help of TH Irwin’s books, but my limited acquaintance with Gadamer does suggest that he was on a similar track.

I hope your semester will come to a satisfying conclusion, and be followed by a happy Christmas.
Best, Bob

I’ve studied under profs with more of a NeoPlatonic slant on Plato, but I still find that a number of Plato’s texts, particularly the Phaedo, can be plausibly interpreted as presenting dualistic ideas (a kind of substance dualism of sorts seems to be taught in the Phaedo on at least one read). I’d be interested in hearing more details of your interpretation of Plato’s Republic, the Symposium and the Timaeus. On your reading is Plato more of an Aristotelian in the sense of not promoting a separate realm of the Forms? Its my understanding that Gadamer proposes a view along these lines, but I would have to do some re-reading to give you the details (and I don’t have time to do that at this point in the semester–sorry!).

Best wishes,
Cynthia

p.s. If you have commented on these things on this blog already–especially if within the last few months–it is likely that I haven’t had the chance to read your comments closely, as it has been a particularly busy semester for me. So feel free to copy and paste.

I’m glad to see you referring to “Platonism traditionally understood,” rather than Platonism as such, as “dualistic.” This interpretation of Platonism certainly does pervade modern philosophy, from Hobbes and Hume through Nietzsche to Martha Nussbaum. But as I’m sure you know, Plotinus takes great pains to distance himself from Gnostic dualism. And as I suggested in an earlier posting, Plato himself seems to take similar pains in Republic iv-vii (the tripartite soul), Symposium, and Timaeus. It’s a pity that Nietzsche, the classicist, didn’t notice this. His prior decision against any kind of transcendence seems to limit his understanding; as is also the case with Hobbes, Hume and (apparently) Nussbaum.

Best, Bob