Comments on: Nietzsche on the Human Tendency to Ossify Metaphors and Christ Who Shatters All Columbaria

By: Cynthia R. Nielsen

Cynthia R. Nielsen — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 04:22:50 +0000

Here’s how I would attempt to draw together some of what you say concerning Nietzsche’s project. Nietzsche denies that we can know, to use Kant’s phrase, “the thing in itself.” We construct “reality” or better “realities,” as the ancient and medieval (Aristotelian) teaching on essences/forms has been rejected. One of the main problems (it seems to me) with such a view is that one can say very little in the realm of ethics or morals. That is, if you fully embrace Nietzsche’s view, how is it possible to establish a criterion for judging between competing “realities”?

By: Chris Donato

Chris Donato — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 02:08:46 +0000

I won’t feign understanding here, but the statement struck me as necessarily leading to perspectivism (no surprise there) and thus to a radical individualism. The self becomes the arbiter of truth, or, rather, the definer of the reality of the thing known. Now, I do see that we come to know nothing apart from ourselves, that our knowledge is therefore in some sense removed from the world “out there” (ding an sich). But is this all Nietzsche was getting at?

I suppose I’m simply wondering out loud that while he was certainly correct to limit reason, to, in your words, warn us against “taking our conceptual edifices to be the reality and the one and only way to truthfully describe and explain the world,” were his epistemological underpinnings consistent with this? I don’t know; you tell me.

By: Cynthia R. Nielsen

Cynthia R. Nielsen — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:01:32 +0000

I don’ t see how the statement you cite would make Nietzsche a hyper-rationalist. Would you explain why you make that conclusion?

By: Chris Donato

Chris Donato — Wed, 15 Apr 2009 17:07:12 +0000

“…Nietzsche concludes that there is no natural connection between what is perceived in the external world and knowledge.”

I guess that’s what confused me. How does this avoid a kind of hyper-rationalism, an outdoing of Plato, if you will?

By: Cynthia R. Nielsen

Cynthia R. Nielsen — Wed, 15 Apr 2009 14:58:14 +0000

I suppose we need to define what we mean by “the empirical.” Nietzsche’s criticism of science should not been seen as stance against the material world. In fact, his polemic against Christianity is that it has given itself over to Plato and his dualism. He famously states, “Christianity is just Platonism for the masses,” that is, it so exalted an other-worldly world that it ends up hating this world, which for Nietzsche is all that there is. Nietzsche is about as far from idealism as one can get.

By: Chris Donato

Chris Donato — Wed, 15 Apr 2009 14:35:23 +0000

For my part, I’m simply wondering if Nietzsche’s denigration of the empirical collapses into some form of subjective idealism? And is that a viable Christian epistemology?

By: Cynthia R. Nielsen

Cynthia R. Nielsen — Wed, 15 Apr 2009 04:34:28 +0000

So are you suggesting that in your experience, 21st century science is more “humble” than the science of Nietzsche’s day and, in fact, recognizes its limitations?

If so, it still seems to me that the common person thinks of the claims of science as authoritative in an almost religious sense. (I’m not anti-science, by the way. I’m simply attempting to describe socio-political phenomena). Also, in the various debates over when life begins etc., scientific data/research is presented both by “experts” (scientists) and laypeople as if it is telling us what really is the case. Legislative policies are created based on these “models” as if they are the truth, reality and not merely approximations.

By: scott

scott — Wed, 15 Apr 2009 03:55:19 +0000

it seems you took me to say that scientific conceptions are provisional. but what i meant was that, for contemporary physical sciences, in my experience, scientific conceptions are typically meant to be special simplifications. approximation is the name of the game, part of the essence of the business. the coin of the realm is ‘model’ — as in ‘a is a model of b’.

if that’s right, difference from reality is very much a part of personal engagement in science and of peer-to-peer communications (e.g. grant proposals, papers, seminars).

i’m not trying to one-up nietzsche — he just seems wrong (insofar as he was speaking of 21st century physical science!)

come to think of it, physical science seems to have difficulty speaking of grand inspiring notions, such as truth or the common good.

By: Cynthia R. Nielsen

Cynthia R. Nielsen — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 04:50:28 +0000

True, many physicists and philosophers of science will readily grant that mathematically-based physics is not an attempt to set forth reality in itself, but is rather a set of hypotheses that are accepted until disproven by new findings etc. Yet, I think Nietzsche’s point can be understood in terms of how those scientists as they engage in their work, defend their work, apply for government grants (and so on), as well as the average person comes to understand science’s claims, namely, not as a provisional set of hypotheses but as *the* truth about reality. When this happens the metaphors have been ossified.

By: scott

scott — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 04:14:28 +0000

for what it’s worth, i doubt that contemporary physical scientists typically take scientific conceptual systems as ‘the truth’.

in my experience of physical science, it is more typical to take a scientific conceptual system as a special simplification. e.g., if you wished to predict where a given projectile would land, you wouldn’t attempt to take into account everything of any physical relevance; you would attempt to identify a few measurable quantities that you could use to make a sufficiently accurate prediction (the fewer the better). a successful system would not provide ‘the truth’ by design (or, better, a successful system would be (acceptably) ‘inaccurate’ by design). this is not only design; it is also a recognition of inability: i cannot even count, much less analyze, everything of some relevance to ’simple’ problems of motion.

it is interesting to try to imagine a world in which no physical phenomenon could be simply approximated, where the network of physical causality was so dense and intricate as to defy building physical theory. cryptographers build little systems which are designed precisely to hide the logic of the system; why not a universe whose physical principles are intractably hidden?