MP: I understand that individual racism might seem more palpable and “real” than indirect, or structural racism. But I question whether this is actually the case. Let’s take an extreme case and look at the pre-civil rights, Jim Crow south. There were two dimensions of racism there. First, you have the individual racism, involving slurs and groups such as the clan, which amounted to fierce bigotry. At the same time, you have a legal order which denies blacks access to the same facilities as whites and makes them second class citizens. Both of these kinds of racism were bad. But I don’t think you can deny that legal segregation was just as real. And, though I’m not black, I doubt that black people then felt that legal segregation was somehow less significant than particular acts of racism outside the law. Segregation had nothing to do with individual acts of racism; it was a racist structure. It was a legal system, justified by supposedly race-neutral legal reasoning, such as Plessy v. Ferguson.

Now, I would argue that the same kind of structural racism that existed during legalized segregation exists today in less obvious and less extreme forms. There are myriad ways that society discriminates against minorities–in employment, law enforcement, and education–that aren’t caused by any individuals acting racist. I call such things “racist” because they continue to sort the life outcomes of individuals by their race. The point here is to move away from a conversation where we’re always talking about what people “intend,” towards a conversation about what actually happens, regardless of how racially-innocent people’s explicit intents might be.

Thanks for reading.

Blake – I appreciate that you attempt to root your theory of structural racism in a foundational notion of consciousness. I have a hard time making the jump from direct impact of another human being’s power to hinder my own autonomy, to a less direct (though admittedly degrading) power that a structure or institution might offer. I just don’t think I’m as likely to define myself by how a structure treats me, as I would by how an individual treats me.

Thus I fail to see how this needs to be attributed to Hegel, DuBois, or anyone else. But I might be failing to grasp the central tenet of what is being said here.

Sincerely,
Russ Whitfield

Thanks for reading. I hope to write a second part at some point, but as I’ve just begun school again, my coursework is consuming my time. I’ll certainly let Cynthia know when I follow up on this work.

As far as readings on structural racism, I’d recommend you to my previous employer (whose work inspired this essay): The Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change. You can read the relevant webpages here: http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/community-change/introduction-project-structural-racism. You can also read a good summary report here: http://www.aecf.org/KnowledgeCenter/Publications.aspx?pubguid={216B91FF-54E1-478A-9EF3-6B4FEA45A525}. Also, check out Iris Marion Young’s work on “Structural Injustice,” and the Critical Race Theorists in critical legal studies for some conceptual background. Kimberle Crenshaw is particularly good on issues of colorblindness.

I Hope this is useful food for thought, in lieu (hopefully temporarily) of a second half to my paper.

Best,

Blake