Per Caritatem

In the fourth section of his essay, Oberman concludes his historical survey with a discussion of the developments in Roman Catholic theology on the relation of Scripture and tradition from Trent to the present [1]. According to Oberman, the T2 view as espoused by Trent has been preserved through the “authority of the Roman catechism and the wide influence of Peter Canisius and Robert Bellarmin” (p. 289). In addition, through the Tübingen School the idea of “living tradition” has come to the fore and can been seen in Johann Adam Möhler’s work, Symbolik (1832), where he describes “tradition as the Gospel living in the Church, not simply as a conservation of the original deposit of faith, but as a development of it. Holy Scripture is for Möhler the matter, the Church, the life-giving form” (p. 289). Oberman also mentions that Vatican I cites formulations given at Trent, which as we have seen supports a T2 view. Oberman then lists a number of dogmas that were declared in the 19th and 20th centuries that have led to a “reconsideration of the relation of the Magisterium as active tradition to the so-called sources of Revelation as the objective tradition” (p. 290). Given the new papal pronouncements and the contributions from theologians such a Cardinal Newman and Jos. Scheeben, a new understanding of tradition began to develop—what Oberman labels as Tradition III (T3). This T3 concept, which was in process of being developed when Oberman wrote his essay, is supported by “those who tend to find in the teaching office of the Church the one and only source for revelation. Scripture and tradition are then not much more than historical monuments of the past. In any case the papal encyclical of Humani Generis of 12th August 1950 can still be understood in terms of Tradition II. According to this authoritative document, the teaching office of the Church is the regula proxima or immediate rule for faith” (p. 290).

This brings us to the final section of Oberman’s essay. Having completed his historical survey, Oberman turns to discuss three systematic observations from what he has said up to this point: “(1) The significance of Tradition I for the Protestant understanding of canon and canonicity; (2) The basic contrast between Protestant and Roman Catholic scholarship; (3) The implications of the development from Tradition II to Tradition III in Roman Catholic theology” (p. 290). Regarding (1), Oberman emphasizes that the sola scriptura principle speaks of the sufficiency of Scripture and expresses both a “doctrinal quantitative perfection” and a “spiritual qualitative perfection.” These quantitative/qualitative distinctions correspond to the Church’s twofold response in terms of fides quae and fides qua —a correspondence which T1 strongly affirms. In addition, the Reformers were more cognizant than their T1 precursors that drawing the material/formal distinction in relation to the sufficiency of Scripture “may carry the dangerous connotation of contrast between the dead matter of Holy Scripture and the life-giving form of the Church. But they [the Reformers] have always emphasized that the sufficiency of Holy Scripture in both its material and formal aspects can only function when Scripture is opened, that is Scripture is seen as the Book given to the Church, which is gathered and guided by the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit as the principal Doctor uses the Church to lead the faithful into all truth, that is, from implicit to explicit truth, to open the Scriptures by his internal testimony; by the drawing up of confessions; but primarily and centrally by the preaching of the kerygma, which is the very Word of God” (pp. 290-291). Though it should be clear by now, nonetheless, I shall insert it anyway—T1 operates with a closed canon, whereas T2 operates with an open canon. Moreover, T2 views the formation of the canon as having been approved or created by the Church. T1, in contrast, accents the reception of the canon by the Church. “Indeed the Church thus acknowledged the necessity of an unambiguous authority amidst the confusing claims of pseudopigraphic literature and oral traditions. Those writings which we now know as the canonical books were received as sharing in the uniqueness of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. It is this unique character which is expressed and respected in the concept of the closed canon” (p. 291).

Regarding (2), Oberman states that in light of the contrast between T1 and T2, both Protestants and Roman Catholics must be aware of and acknowledge the differing “doctrinal bases” so that fruitful interchanges can occur. Here Oberman points to the difference between a Protestant and Roman Catholic conception of the task of theology (this is not the only task of course). “Humani generis declared in 1950 that it is the task of theology to show in what way a doctrine defined by the Church is contained in the sources of faith: Scripture and Tradition [A.A.S., 42.568]. The task of the doctor, be he biblical scholar or Christian historian, is to read the latest doctrinal decisions back into his sources” (pp. 292-293).

Next, Oberman turns to J. Scheeben, who at the end of the 19th century acknowledged that not all catholic truths are contained in Holy Scripture, and whose distinction between analytic and synthetic interpretation helps us to better understand the differences between Protestant and Roman Catholic scholarship as it relates to our present inquiry. To illustrate his point, Oberman reminds us of his argument against Geiselmann’s thesis which was done via the analytical approach. As Oberman has also brought to our attention, it is the prerogative of the Roman Catholic Church to interpret its own sources. More specifically, the magisterium is charged with interpreting its past documents in light of the fact that the teaching office is the “authoritative centre of the living tradition. By adding now to the traditional analytic method the synthetic method of interpretation, the Tridentine decree cannot constitute for the Church an obstacle for accepting officially the thesis that everything is simultaneously contained in Scripture and tradition. Once such a doctrine would be officially defined which is not, or at least, not yet, it would instantly become the task of the Roman Catholic theologian to support Geiselmann’s interpretation of the Tridentine decrees” (p. 294). This difference in interpretative procedures must be kept in mind if one hopes for a productive and intelligent dialogue between the two parties.

Lastly, Oberman addresses (3) and asks whether T3 is a movement toward T1 and hence a drawing nearer to the Protestant position. According to Oberman, it is not, but rather indicates that T2 has developed into T3. [Keep in mind that Oberman’s essay was written prior to the completion of Vatican II documents, which is a point I will address in my final post in this series]. As Oberman has explained things, T1 gave rise to T2 due to the fact that theologians and canon lawyers realized that “all the truths actually held by the Church could not be found explicitly or implicitly in Holy Scripture. Especially due to the mariological dogmas of 1854 and 1950, theologians have concluded once again, that not only Scripture, but now also Scripture and tradition taken together are materially insufficient to support by simple explication these authoritative definitions. Scripture and tradition are still held to be the sources, and the Teaching office of the Church, the norm which preserves and interprets the sources [Apostolic Constitution Munifecentissimus Deus. Nov. 1, 1950, A.A.S. 42 (1950), p. 757]. But in as much as this interpretation is synthetic, the norm takes on the function of the source. The Apostolic Constitution in which the bodily assumption of the Virgin Mary is defined refers to the unique consensus, not of the Church of all ages, but of the present-day Church. Not as an argument for, but as part of this authoritative definition it is announced that this divine truth is contained in the deposit of faith” (p. 294).

In his essay, Oberman has traced the movement from T1 where the material sufficiency of Scripture is maintained, to T2 in which both Scripture and Tradition constitute two sources requiring equal respect, to T3 in which, from a Protestant perspective, the magisterium is not only too highly exalted, but it also seems to be able to re-write its own official (infallible) dogma. [In my concluding post, I will attempt to give a possible Catholic response to the charge made in my last statement, and I welcome other possible Catholic responses as well].

Notes

[1] Oberman’s essay was published in 1962, which means that it predates Vatican II. Given that Oberman did not interact with V2 documents and especially with Dei Verbum, one would want to continue this dialogue with the most current Roman Catholic pronouncements on the relation of Scripture and tradition. I will return to this point in the concluding section of this series.

[2] A.A.S., 42, p. 567, ‘Totum depositum fidei…et custodiendum et tuendum et interpretandum concrederit (Magisterio)’, as cited in Oberman, p. 294.

Oberman begins section three by distinguishing between “Tradition I” (T1) and “Tradition II” (T2). T1 stands for what has been described as the “exegetical tradition of interpreted scripture,” whereas T2 represents the “two-sources theory which allows for an extra-biblical oral tradition” (p. 280). As we have seen, both T1 and T2 have their medieval supporters. Moreover, as was mentioned previously, the canon lawyers in the Basilean line follow the two-sources theory with both sources requiring equal respect. The doctors, in contrast, begin to develop the oral tradition in a more subtle fashion. “In theory the material sufficiency of Holy Scripture is upheld long after it has been given up in actuality. The key term of this development is the word ‘implicit’ and the history of this term is one of increasing loss in content. When then finally the two propositions—‘Holy Scripture implicitly says’ and ‘Holy Scripture silently says’—are equated, the exegetical concept of Tradition I has fully developed into what we called Tradition II” (pp. 281-282).

With this history in mind, Oberman suggests that we will better understand the Council of Trent and later Roman Catholic theology [pre-Vatican II]. In light of everything that has been said up to this point, we see the difficulty of tracing T1 to the early part of the Middle Ages because in this period T1 and T2 cannot be sharply separated. This conflation or blurring of lines between the two has to do with the fact that those adhering de facto to T2 continue to claim to support the material sufficiency of scripture. Yet, according to Oberman, after the nominalists (e.g., Ockham, Gerson, d’Ailly and Biel) pave the way for Trent’s reception of T2, the historian can begin to gain a clearer understanding of the differences on both sides of the argument—an argument which is not one of Scripture verses tradition (p. 282). For example, Wyclif, Hus, and Gansfort do not oppose Scripture to tradition, rather they argue for T1 over T2. “True to Vincent’s five restrictive requirements for an authoritative tradition, they defend along with the material sufficiency of Holy Scripture the authority of the exegetical tradition whenever there is a common and explicit witness of the Fathers, in particular of the four great doctors of the Church: Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose and Gregory” (p. 282). Nor do the adherents of T1 deny the importance of episcopal succession for the purpose of preserving the truth. “They indeed regard tradition as the execution of the custodian’s task of the Church. But in contrast to those holding to Tradition II, the emphasis falls rather on the successio doctorum than on the successio episcoporum” (pp. 282-283).

As Oberman argues, Trent represents T2, and the Reformers represent T1. Oberman again reiterates that just as was the case in the later Middle Ages, so too is it the case in the period of Reformation and Counter-Reformation that the conflict is one of a clash of between two concepts of tradition (T1 and T2). Luther of course taught what is known as the sola scriptura principle. However, one should not understand this principle as denying the coinherence of Church and Scripture, but rather as operating within the context of T1, not T2. Throughout the many theological changes that Luther underwent, he never denied the importance of and need for T1.

With regard to the historical details of Trent, Oberman states that in its fourth session, the Council of Trent endorsed T2. In other words, by sanctioning the two-source theory, the extra-scriptural apostolic tradition is to be esteemed on the same level as Holy Scripture. “This implies not only that the successio fidei coincides with the successio episcoporum, but also an elevation of the authority of the Church above the authority of the canonized apostolic kerygma. Due to the restrictive localization of the testimonium internum of the Holy Spirit in the teaching office of the Church, Holy Scripture can only have a mute authority” (p. 286).

Oberman next cites two scholars, Joseph Geiselmann and Father George Tavard who have argued that the main post-Tridentine theologians have misinterpreted Trent as promoting a two-sources theory. Geiselmann and Tavard claim that the Council implicitly accepted the sufficiency of Scripture, and that they viewed tradition as the viva vox evangelii—which would in effect reflect a T1 position. Oberman, however, disagrees with Geiselmann’s thesis (which implicates Tavard as well) for the following reasons, which I will quote in toto:

(a) “The partly-partly (partim-partim) formula of the original draft of the Tridentine decree on the respective authorities of Scripture and tradition cannot be explained away as a product of nominalistic philosophy as Geiselmann suggests. Though one has to cede to the nominalistic theologians the honour of having made the two-sources theory ripe for its official reception at Trent, the formulation ‘partly-partly’ as such is rare and has not yet been traced to a nominalist theologian. The more current translation of the Basilean passage, ‘some—and others’ (quasdam-quasdam), is used by Gabriel Biel but can be traced back to the early medieval canonists. In view of such textual history, one would be well advised not to give too much weight to the change of the initial ‘partly-partly’ to the copulative ‘and’ (et). All three formulations render satisfactory St. Basil’s own choice of words (ta men, ta de).”

(b) “This conclusion is borne out by the statement of the cardinal legate Cervini who announces on 6th April 1546 after a night spent on the revision of the original draft that the final version is ‘in substance’ the same. This would hardly seem compatible with the idea that the Council changed its mind.”

(c) “The energetic protest against the ‘partly-partly’ formulation which Geislemann cites as the cause for the alleged change proves to be limited to two representatives, Bonacci and Nacchianti, of which the first stands under suspicion of heresy on points related to Scripture and tradition and the second was once called ‘avid for novelties’.”

(d) “The Catechismus Romanus (1566) quite clearly interprets ‘and’ (et) as ‘partly-partly’ (partim-partim) when it states that the Word of God is distributed over scripture and tradition” (pp. 287-288).

The bottom line is that according to Oberman, the Council of Trent clearly teaches a two-sources theory in its admission that all doctrinal truths are not found in Scripture. Tradition is a second source that “by adding its own substance complements Holy Scripture. The gradually eroded connection between explicit and implicit truths has been snapped; the exegetical tradition has been transformed into Tradition II” (p. 288). Oberman ends this section by noting that Geiselmann’s thesis has exercised much influence on a large segment of contemporary Roman Catholic theology. Moreover, though Geiselmann desires to demonstrate the error of the two-sources theory, this does not mean that he moves us to a T1 position.

In the second section of his essay, Oberman moves into a discussion of the concept of tradition that characterized the fourth and fifth centuries. First, however, he summarizes two important points of the pre-Augustinian concept of tradition: (1) “The immediate divine origin of tradition together with the insistence on a clearly circumscribed series of historical acts of God in the rule of faith or the rule of truth;” (2) “The rejection of extra-scriptural tradition.”

Oberman begins by appealing to the work of Father George Tavard. In his book Holy Writ or Holy Church, Tavard claims that a seamless continuity of the organic relation of scripture and tradition existed between patristic and medieval theology until the 14th century. However, two new currents of thought began to threaten this understanding: (1) “one which opposes the Scriptures to the Church in admitting the possibility that only a remnant in the visible Church would be obedient to Scripture;” (2) “one which introduces the concept of post-apostolic and oral traditions and raises the Holy See to the dignity of judge of post-apostolic revelation” (p. 276). With the canon lawyers, according to Tavard we see a break with “medieval classicism. Living authority replaces both Scripture and its traditional interpretation” (Holy Writ or Holy Church, p. 39, as cited in Oberman, p. 276). Yet, Tavard also points out that the opposing group, viz., those who claimed that Scripture alone was the sole standard of truth for the Church, were also responsible for destroying the patristic-medieval unity—“from this to the doctrines of the Reformation there is only a difference of degree” (Holy Writ or Holy Church, p. 40, as cited in Oberman, p. 276).

According to Oberman, the shift away from the coinherence of Scripture and Church as maintained by the patristic-medieval vision that Tavard highlights can be traced back to the early Middle Ages—specifically to Basil the Great (c. 330-370) whose views on the subject where later propagated by Augustine. A new concept of tradition is set forth in Basil’s work, On the Holy Spirit. “We meet here for the first time the idea that the Christian owes equal respect and obedience to the written and to the unwritten ecclesiastical traditions, whether they are contained in the canonical writings or in the secret oral tradition handed down by the Apostles through succession” (p. 277). A number of canon lawyers (e.g., Ivo of Chartres and Gratian of Bologna) circulate Basil’s ideas in their writings and thus help to establish the two-sources theory for canon lawyers. For the medieval doctor of theology, however, Scripture remains the “authoritative source which stands in judgment over the interpretation of later commentators. The term ‘sacred page’ for theology is indicative for this close relationship” (p. 277). Such a view can be seen in St. Thomas Aquinas’ work. In the Summa Theologica, Thomas writes, “sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities [those of the philosophers] as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): ‘Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning’” (ST I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2).

Turning to Augustine, Oberman notes that although Augustine asserts the primacy of Scripture, he did not set this in opposition with the authority of the Catholic Church, “…I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me” [Contra ep. fund., 5], (p. 278). Disagreement soon ensued over the nature of the moving power (commovere of the Church. Some argued that the Church has a practical and instrumental authority (Gregory of Rimini), while others toward the end of the 14th century argued that Augustine’s statement points to a metaphysical priority. That is, in contrast to the idea that the Church’s authority over Scripture had a practical priority in a way similar to the function of Jesus’ miracles, viz., to urge his hearers to believe His words, the “moving authority of the Church becomes in late medieval versions the Church’s approval or creation of Holy Scripture” (p. 278). In distinction from Irenaeus’ and Tertullian’s emphasis on the sufficiency of Scripture, Augustine promotes an authoritative extra-scriptural oral tradition. “While on the one hand the Church ‘moves’ the faithful to discover the authority of Scripture, Scripture on the other hand refers the faithful back to the authority of the Church with regard to a series of issues with which the Apostles did not deal in writing” (p. 279).

Oberman then asks whether the Commonitorium of Vincent of Lerins written in the 5th century has contributed to furthering the two-sources theory. Vincent’s famous thesis is that the Catholic Church must hold to that which has been believed everywhere, always and by everyone—a thesis which seems to permit the idea of an authoritative extra-biblical tradition. Oberman, however, argues that when read in context we find that Vincent accepts the material sufficiency of scripture but rejects its formal sufficiency. “He [Vincent] insists that Holy Scripture needs to be interpreted by the Church since the heretics from Novation to Nestorius all advanced their own exegeses of biblical passages” [Commonitorium II.2], (p. 277). Vincent sees the task of interpretation as preservation and protection against the possibility of perverting what the Apostles have handed down. For Vincent, proper biblical exegesis is not safeguarded “in a secret oral tradition traceable to the Apostles themselves, but in the explicit consensus of the Fathers which provides a safeguard against arbitrary interpretation” (p. 279). Vincent seems to follow St. Thomas in that he does not want the interpretation of the Church to effectively become a second source apart from Holy Scripture. For Vincent, as was the case for Thomas, the “Fathers are in principle magistri probabiles, teachers whose utterances are probable but do not yet constitute proof (seeST I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2; emphasis added). In fact, the statements of the Fathers come to represent the deposit of faith only when the following five requirements are satisfied: (1) all the Fathers must be of one mind on the issue (non unus aut duo tantum sed omnes pariter; (2) “the consensus has to be exactly the same ( uno eodemque consensu); (3) their opinion should be openly and explicitly formulated (aperte); repeatedly advanced (frequenter); and (5) continuously held, written and taught (perseveranter tenuisse, scripsisse, docuisse)” (p. 280). Oberman concludes the section by noting that though it is often taught (and may very well be the case) that Vincent directs his Commonitorium against Augustine’s strong teaching on predestination, nonetheless, “one does not tax the sources too heavily when one concludes that Vincent here directs his concept of authoritative exegetical tradition primarily against a two-sources theory” (p. 280).