Per Caritatem

The Catholic scholar, John Patrick Donnelly, S.J. in his book, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace, shows that Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562) was thoroughly acquainted with Aristotle and St. Thomas, as well as a number of other medievals (Lombard), patristics, and numerous ancient philosophers. In fact, Vermigli wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; however, he only completed through book III. Vermigli’s approach to the relationship of theology and philosophy and the appropriation of the latter for the service of the former, has much in common with St.Thomas.

Having examined Vermigli’s thought on a number of topics (e.g., reason and revelation, philosophical anthropology, soteriology), Donnelly, near the end of his book, devotes some space to address the claims of older scholarship on the supposed intrinsic link between Protestantism and nominalism. Representatives of the older view, e.g., John Todd and Joseph Lortz, see nominalism as a “decadent scholasticism, even a theology no longer authentically Catholic. They see Luther’s theology partly as a direct result of his nominalist background, partly as a reaction against it, especially its Pelagianism. For these Catholic authors several of Luther’s central teachings—justification by extrinsic imputation, simul justus et peccator, predestination, distrust of human reason—are rooted in nominalist presuppositions. In fact, none of these Catholic authors has an expert background in nominalist theology or philosophy. Recent research, especially that of Heiko Oberman, has revised their interpretation of nominalism, seeing it in a more favorable light, employing more precise scholarship, and re-opening the question of Luther’s relation to the whole Occamist tradition[1]” (pp. 202-203). Donnelly goes on to say that he is not necessarily denying certain aspects of the influence of nominalism on Luther’s personal development, nor is he purporting to give an analysis of the “proper evaluation of nominalism as a philosophical or theological system” (p. 204). It is, however, a calling-into-question the claim that there is an intrinsic connection between Protestantism and nominalism. “The thesis that Occam is the foster father of Protestantism needs revision in the light of Peter Martyr’s theology.” With Martyr, we have a theologian who maintains essential continuity with the Protestant distinctives of Calvin and Luther; however, Martyr “came to these conclusions out of a generally Thomistic rather than Occamist background. The same applies a fortiori to Zanchi [1516-1592]” (p. 204).

Notes
[1] In a footnote (n. 13), Donnelly states that “several recent Catholic studies, independently of Oberman, have begun a reassessment of the relationship between nominalism and the Reformation, particularly McSorley, 183-215, and Francis Clark, Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation, (London: 1960), 296-322. William J. Courtenay reviews the recent literature, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” […] in Charles Trinkas and Heiko A. Oberman, editors, The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, (Leiden, 1974),” [Donnelly, p. 203].

Oberman discusses Luther’s relationship to nominalism (focusing more on nominalistic theology, than philosophy) in chapter 4 of his book, The Dawn of the Reformation. As is well-known, Luther was trained at Erfurt under nominalist professors (e.g., Trutvutter—a disciple of Biel). A common claim is that the “young Luther” was more nominalist in his theology than the “mature Luther.” However, Oberman contests this claim and argues that the “youngest” Luther of 1509—a mere sententiarius—had in fact already separated himself from his nominalist professors in regard to their understanding of the relation of faith and reason, while still seemingly adhering to the doctrine of facere quod in se est (“to do what is in oneself”) until 1515-16 (p. 96). For the nominialist theologians (e.g., Holcot), the doctrine of facere quod in se est functioned as the only bridge connecting the knowledge of man and the knowledge of God. However, as Oberman notes, “the bridge should not be taken as a symbol of natural harmony between reason and faith since the range of man’s rational powers falls short of the mysteries of faith. […] The facere quod in se est allows the nominalist to posit at once the discontinuity of faith and reason and the moral and intellectual responsibility of the individual in search for God” (pp. 96-97).

Though it is uncontested that Luther in his Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517) attacks the medieval tradition and completely breaks from a nominalistic understanding of the relation between faith and reason and the relation between the will and grace via the doctrine of facere quod in se est, Oberman seeks to map out the stages at which Luther reached his conclusions. Luther’s rejection of the doctrine of facere quod in se est in relation to a human being’s moral powers means “that what precedes grace is not a disposition but an indisposition and rebellion. The proper disposition for the reception of grace is an effect of God’s eternal election and predestination. Applied to man’s rational powers this means that ignorance of God is seen as a characteristic of fallen nature” (pp. 97-98). Yet, Oberman shows that even prior to the 1517 Disputatio[1] Luther had already taught that “the sinner cannot prepare himself for grace either de congruo or de condigno. Inferred from this is the conclusion that the man who does what is in him [the facere quod in se est doctrine]—with his will or his reason—sins” (p. 98).

Though there has been much discussion regarding Luther’s silence and somewhat puzzling comments on Ps. 113:1 in 1515 and Rom. 14:1 in 1516 as to the relation of reason and revelation in connection with the doctrine of facere quod in se est, Oberman argues that this does not necessarily indicate that Luther accepted this aspect of the doctrine without reservations. Regarding Ps. 113:1, Luther discusses and rejects only the nominalistic interpretation of the relation of the will and grace and is silent on reason and revelation. At this time (1515), Luther seems to show a certain respect for the doctrine of facere quod in se est. When commenting on Rom. 14:1 he again rejects only the first aspect (the relation of will and grace) of the facere quod in se est, yet here he begins adding qualifications to the nominalistic teaching which suggests that a change is in process or has already occurred. For example, Luther tries to salvage the facere quod in se est by claiming that the problem with it is in its Pelagian interpretation stating that a person is able to prepare himself for the reception of grace, not with the teaching in itself. However, as Oberman notes, this is an odd distinction because the ability to prepare oneself for grace is the main point of the teaching (p. 99). Oberman’s approach then is to be attentive to the “plurality of levels” and complexity of Luther’s thought in transition. Given the fact that Luther supported the doctrine of facere quod in se est in 1515 and six months later in 1516 comes to reject it, helps to explain the qualified remarks in his comments on Rom. 14:1. In addition, Oberman appeals to Luther’s comments on the Collectorium of Gabriel Biel—comments penned during the 1515-16 time frame. In these writings, Luther is extremely critical of Biel’s theology, and his criticism is aimed at both Biel’s teaching on the relation between the will and grace, as well as the relation between reason and revelation (p. 101). Thus, we find Luther working out his theology and finally coming to a complete rejection of both aspects of the facere quod in se est teaching in his later disputations of 1516-17.

Interestingly and adding to the complexity, Oberman ends the section with the following: “Perhaps the most striking evidence is that the two main points in the frontal attack against the doctrine of the facere quod in se est in the Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517), […] are to be found in the marginals of 1509-1510: (1) the contrast between light and darkness to express the obstacle of philosophy for theology; (2) the understanding of the preparation on the part of man as an effect of God’s prevenient initiative. The first time, then, that we encounter Luther, we find that he so stresses God’s provenience in the act of faith that there is no place any more for the nominalistic intpretation of the fides ex auditu as the faith man can acquire when he does what is in him. For Luther fides ex auditu is a gift of God. […] Not merely the ‘young Luther,’ but the ‘youngest Luther,’ even before beginning his career as a professor, as a biblical exegete, and eventually as a Reformer, has on points which later prove to be cornerstones in the structure of his thought become independent of the nominalisitic theological tradition in which he was reared” (pp. 102-3).

Notes
[1] E.g., Luther defends these views when he chairs a disputation of theses on September 25, 1516 and when lecturing on the Epistle to the Romans from November 1515 till September, 1516 (p. 98).