Is interpretation primarily about a relation between the reader and the subjective intentions of the author?  Might it be the case that the hermeneutical method that E.D. Hirsch espouses in his book, Validity in Interpretation, lands us right back into the egocentric predicament, as the sole goal of interpretation becomes re-producing the original subjective meaning [...]

I came across this delightful little passage in Catherine H. Zuckert’s article, “Hermeneutics in Practice:  Gadamer on Ancient Philosophy.”  Anyone who has done graduate work at UD (and who is not a Straussian) will appreciate this.
Gadamer made the difference between what he means by reading a text in its own terms and Leo Strauss’s insistence [...]

In a section discussing the ways in which Gadamer relativizes Heidegger’s ontological difference, Wachterhauser states the following:
If [according to Gadamer] we cannot raise issues of Being apart from other related issues like Being’s relationship to the other transcendentals-including the Good-and these issues in turn involve us in questions about the relationships between transcendentals and Ideas, [...]

Given Gadamer’s rejection of a foundationalist paradigm of knowledge, he does not attempt to provide indubitable justification for his ontological views.   According to Gadamer, all forms of foundationalism fail to demonstrate that their own claims are indubitable; hence, he “rejects the possibility of a reflexive self-grounding of any philosophical position.”  Rather, as we have seen, [...]

As mentioned in Part II, Gadamer’s conception of identity is dynamic rather than static and is based on Gadamer’s critical reworking of Plato’s reflections on unity and multiplicity.  As Wachterhauser explains, Gadamer’s “general strategy is to argue that all Being is such that it is always at one and the same time both ‘one and [...]

As Wachterhauser stresses, Gadamer’s path avoids the pitfalls of both the relativist and the ahistorical dogmatist, not by eschewing all things metaphysical, but rather by gleaning ontological insights from ancient philosophy (particularly the later Plato).   Here we encounter a significant divergence between Gadamer and Heidegger in that the former rejects important aspects of Heidegger’s critique [...]

Brice R. Wachterhauser, in his book, Beyond Being:  Gadamer’s Post-Platonic Hermeneutical Ontololgy, argues that Gadamer’s hermeneutical studies must be read in dialogue with his work on Plato in order to properly understand a number of Gadamer’s significant hermeneutical insights, as well as to avoid common misreadings of Gadamer.     In other words, Wachterhauser’s claim is that [...]

According to Gadamer, we all have “fore-meanings” that we bring to the text-meanings that we each employ as a kind of standard in our attempts to understand the text.  If this is the case and my fore-meanings do not exactly match your fore-meanings, are we in a hopeless hermeneutical situation?  Gadamer answers with an emphatic [...]

According to Gadamer, romanticism shares a certain schema of the philosophy of history with the Enlightenment. In its reaction to the Enlightenment, romanticism takes this schema as a premise, viz., “the schema of the conquest of mythos by logos.”  Gadamer goes on to say, “[w]hat gives this schema its validity is the presupposition of the [...]

In preparing for the Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference this fall at Villanova, I have been reviewing texts by Augustine and Gadamer, as one of the goals of my paper (see abstract) is to bring the two into fruitful conversation. 
According to Gadamer, though it is the case that our prejudices and presuppositions can and do [...]

In agreement with Gadamer, Augustine did not conceive of biblical hermeneutics as akin to solving a math problem—a model which assumes a univocal, “flat” understanding of meaning (and reality) and denies an analogical, “symbolic” approach to meaning (and reality). In contrast with, e.g., a strict grammatico-historical hermeneutic (as instituted by B. Spinoza), the Church Fathers [...]

The Word In-Excess
Now that we have traced Augustine’s journey to his conversion, I want to spend some time discussing Augustine’s more humble orientation toward Scripture and the ways in which his hermeneutical practices have much in common with certain postmodern sympathies, and conversely, the ways in which Augustine’s approach to Scripture contrasts with modern biblical [...]

In the last section of his essay, “Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the Question of Relativism,” Echeverria argues that Gadamer is a kind of realist about truth and reality. This is not to say that Gadamer explicitly develops his position as a realist in his writings; however, it is to point to certain aspects of Gadamer’s hermeneutics [...]

Eduardo J. Echeverria, in his essay, “Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the Question of Relativism,” begins by citing a passage from Truth and Method in which Gadamer claims that human reason is both situated in and limited to historical circumstances. Though Gadamer rejects what Echeverria calls “absolute reason”—a kind of universal, objective human reason transcending history—Echeverria argues [...]

A nice passage to contemplate by Hans-Helmuth Gander on Gadamer’s historically-friendly description of a human being as “biography”:
“Reflection on history means as well, therefore, that the one reflecting is himself always already involved in history. No one simply ‘takes up’ history, and no one begins it; for this reason a single reflection on history is [...]

In stark contrast to a modern aversion to prejudice or bias as a hindrance to “objectivity,” Gadamer presents a positive view of prejudices in his view of hermeneutics. According to Gadamer, all of us come to the text with our own prejudices or “horizons” and these biases are not be understood as solely negative or [...]

In Kathleen Wright’s article, “On What We Have in Common: The Universality of Philosophical Hermeneutics,” she writes the following regarding Gadamer’s understanding of the universality of hermeneutics:
“the universal aspect of hermeneutics has to do with the community we join and the communion we feel in and through the fusion of horizons.”
What Wright wants to highlight [...]

In an excellent introductory essay to Gadamer’s work, Philosophical Hermeneutics, David Linge discusses the ways in which Gadamer’s phenomenology of the game overcomes a number of hermeneutical difficulties. For example, instead of attempting to explicate understanding from the subjective points of view of the author or interpreter, Gadamer describes understanding as analogous to what [...]

Wanting to avoid a “logic of reciprocity” [echoing Levinas] in which a dialogue turns into a monologue, as when one party sets the terms of reciprocity, Benson turns to Gadamer in order to begin mapping out what a healthy dialogue might look like. According to Gadamer, “good will” toward the other, as opposed to “proving [...]

In a section discussing the ever-so subjective topic of music “restoration,” in which among other preferences, one might focus more on the letter of the piece or on the spirit in trying to re-capture the more “authentic” Bach, Beethoven, or Chopin, Bruce Ellis Benson, writes,
“Following Hegel, Gadamer argues that an essential ingredient in having a [...]